Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)
2022

Fifth-Dimensional Warfare and National Security in Canada:
Situating Microdeviation Theory Within C-59: An Act Respecting
National Security Matters
Hayden Slight
slig8390@mylaurier.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, Defense
and Security Studies Commons, International Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legislation
Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Slight, Hayden, "Fifth-Dimensional Warfare and National Security in Canada: Situating Microdeviation
Theory Within C-59: An Act Respecting National Security Matters" (2022). Theses and Dissertations
(Comprehensive). 2490.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/2490

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Fifth-Dimensional Warfare and National Security in Canada:
Situating Microdeviation Theory Within C-59: An Act Respecting National Security Matters
by
Hayden Slight
Master of Arts, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2022
THESIS
Submitted to the Department/Faculty of Criminology
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
Master of Arts in Criminology
Wilfrid Laurier University

© Hayden L Slight 2022

MICRODEVIATIONS AND BILL C:59

SLIGHT 1

ABSTRACT
In an era of rapid technological change, the growing threat environment in the cyber
dimension will continue to influence how a sovereign nation contends with attacks that can occur
from any corner of the world. The growing adaptation and expansion of technology belonging to
the Internet of Things (IoT) and the increasing prevalence of social media (Facebook, Twitter)
has also influenced the spreading of attack surfaces that can become victim to exploitation by
motivated parties including foreign states and terrorist groups. Against this backdrop, Canada’s
own efforts to modernize and reinforce its own national security agencies resulted in the
developing and royal assent of 2017’s Bill C-59: An Act Respecting National Security Matters.
The royal assent of C-59 poses a unique opportunity to examine the underlying narratives and
evidence used by expert witnesses and committee members alike to frame the threat that the
cyber environment has when influencing C-59’s more controversial measures. This includes the
expansion of the Communication Security Establishment’s (CSE) traditional 3-part mandate to
include the use of cyberoperations, or the expansion of Canada’s nation security agencies to
utilize the loosely defined “public datasets” despite concerns of possible misappropriation.
Utilizing Popham’s (2018) Theory of Microdeviation, this thesis highlights the normalized
experiences of Canadians online when considering the exploitation of IoT technology and social
media to conduct attacks or sabotage against democratic states, and how these narratives were
often used to advance C59’s modernization push. Finally, this thesis also analyzes the
implications of C-59 when considering the international community as it relates to a growing
cyber arms race akin to 20th century Cold War fears, and how Microdeviation Theory has utility
when examining the goals of legislation seeking to control deviant behaviour online.
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INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of unfettered and rapid technological advancement in a digital age,
the boundaries that delineate theatres of war or where the physical embodiments of a person end
and the digitalized self begin are continuing to erode. The benefits that digital technologies in
particular have provided an increasingly crucial component to the function of every Canadians
livelihood as more devices become integrated into the Internet of Things (IoT). Advancements
made into the proficiency of internet technology such as the advent of social media platforms or
the proliferation of SMART technology (i.e., the integration of traditional products such as
appliances to the internet with advanced features) has enabled luxuries to the social lives of
individuals by providing near instantaneous connections to global communities and resources.
For the purpose of this paper, Maras (2015) defines the IoT as it “refers to the connection of
everyday objects (eg TVs, appliances, and exercise equipment) to the Internet. It enables the
real-time monitoring and vast collection of data about property, people, plants, and animals” (pg.
99). However, this proliferation and subsequent integration of the internet and social media has
also posed additional problems when considering the overt dependence on the platform as an
avenue of information that can be tailored or filtered to an individual’s preferences
(Arayankalam & Krishnan, 2021; Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). In recent years, this dependence
by users internationally has become subject to misinformation campaigns via foreign states and
terrorist groups that seek to proliferate divisive or radicalized content that can have adverse
impacts outside of the platform and threaten national security by forgoing traditional weaponry
in favor or creating vice amongst populations or leveraging contemporary technology as acts of
aggression (Arayankalam & Krishnan, 2021). Following the revelations of disinformation
campaigns being utilized in the 2016 United States Presidential Election, Canada’s own national
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security agencies, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) had published several reports warning of the threat that rapidly
evolving technology and misinformation campaigns can inflict upon Canada (CSE, 2018; CSIS,
2018). A notable factor to these concerns is that Canadian usage of IoT technology and growing
utilization of social media platforms has itself presented a potential threat to Canada’s national
security as these platforms are exploited for varying degrees of malicious gain.
Being a relatively new development, the advent of social media and rapid onset of
digitally extending the social lives of individuals poses significant questions to whether certain
consumption behaviours online can be effectively legislated or protected from exploitation.
While social media platforms have provided a new form of digitally connecting with other likeminded individuals, it has also opened the door for criminally motivated bodies to exploit the
underlying function of these platforms and utilize them in such a way to further sow discord and
extremism that translates into real-world events (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). A notable example
of this strategy concerns the utilization of disinformation on social media platforms against
Ukraine citizens by Russia to advance pro-Russia separatism, prevent Ukraine’s transformation
into part of the external border of NATO and the EU, and alleviate global sanctions brought forth
from Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea (Forrester, Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019).
Further complicating this concerns prior attempts at legislating online behaviours and their
inability to effectively regulate behaviours online while adhering to Charter protection (Taylor,
2016).
CSIS’ Disinformation Report, which saw the convergence of scholars and professionals
to discuss and highlight new and growing threat environments to Canada, specifically noted
foreign interference threats that Russia and China posed regarding the growing use of social
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media platforms and internet technology as a part of their own national security strategies to
advance foreign policy objectives (2018). This included the hijacking of traditional social media
platforms to further spread disinformation favorable to the state’s foreign policy objectives and
weaken the cognitive resistance of a states populace to greatly enable the spread of false news or
narratives online (Buchanan, 2020). CSIS’ (2018) report also highlighted how these platforms
are being utilized by motivated individuals and groups across different ideological and political
spectrums to advance radical narratives as factual and drive recruitment of vulnerable
individuals. Once a narrative or perspective is established, they will use social media or digital
news outlets to ensure posts go viral ensuring its acceptance among other users (page 17). As an
example, the report highlights a 2017 mass shooting in Texas where a 26-year-old was identified
who had a history of domestic violence and was discharged from the US Air Force as being the
suspect. The report further notes that “however, before that narrative developed, and then
continuing even after it had been established, an alternative narrative claimed that the suspect
was really an Antifa terrorist” (p.16) and had already begun to weaponize doctored media and
exploit social media platforms to perpetuate the disinformation on the suspect. The report
additionally noted the organizations that host these platforms have been reluctant to addressing
the issue of moderating disinformation, either by willful ignorance or interestingly a position that
these platforms need to maintain a philosophical position to the open sharing of information
(page 10). A critical point to be taken from both CSIS and CSE reports on modern national
security threats is that IoT advancements in both social media and the internet in the context of
an increasing reliance by Canadians is continuing to open new paths to exploitation by both
foreign and domestic threats.
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The threat that these internet products pose towards democratic institutions and critical
infrastructure were some of the key drivers in securing the royal assent of 2017s Bill C-59: An
Act Respecting National Security Matters. Introduced by the then Liberal majority government,
the legislation sought to modernize Canada’s national security strategies against the backdrop of
an evolving threat landscape while also rectifying controversial measures contained in its
predecessor, Bill C-51: Anti-Terror Act (2015). A radical piece of legislation, the bill brought
sweeping reform to the overall structure, oversight, and mandates of Canada’s national security
agencies, namely, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) (West, 2018). This act received royal assent and thus came into force
in June 2019. C-59 also addressed oversight and review shortcomings of its predecessor C-51 by
merging the agencies respective review committees (Notably, the Security Intelligence Review
Committee and the CSE Commissioner) and formalizing the Intelligence Commissioner (IO)
office for the purposes of authorizing and reviewing the activities carried out by the respective
agencies (Nesbitt & West, 2019). As Canada’s primary signals intelligence agency, the CSE is
tasked with protecting critical Federal electronic infrastructure and communication networks,
providing foreign intelligence as it relates to Canadian national security, and is the primary
authority for cyber security and information assurance (Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, &
Deibert, 2017). Under the guise of requiring a modernized national security strategy and a revisit
towards C-51’s controversial amendments, C-59 represents the first time in Canadian history that
the CSE be established under its own legislative constitution, while also empowering the agency
with 2 new directives under its then 3-part mandate that dramatically empowers the agency with
new cyber-capabilities to assist in carrying out their objectives (West, 2018). Prior to C-59, CSE’
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mandates were contained in the National Defence Act (NDA). Section 273.64(1) of the NDA
outlined the agencies mandates as “a” “b”, and “c” whereby:
a) to acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure for the purpose
of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with Government of Canada intelligence
priorities;
b) to provide advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of electronic
information and of information infrastructures of importance to the Government of
Canada; and
c) to provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security
agencies in the performance of their lawful duties
While C-59 brought these mandates under sections 16, 17, and 18 of the Communications
Security Establishment Act, sections 19 and 20 in C-59 provides the legislative authority to
expanding CSE’ mandate to utilize new measures to become a more active role in Canada’s
national security strategies through cyberoperations:
19) The defensive cyber operations aspect of the Establishment’s mandate is to carry out
activities on or through the global information infrastructure to help protect
a. federal institutions’ electronic information and information infrastructures; and
b. electronic information and information infrastructures designated under
subsection 22(1) as being of importance to the Government of Canada.
20) The active cyber operations aspect of the Establishment’s mandate is to carry out
activities on or through the global information infrastructure to degrade, disrupt,
influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign
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individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs,
defence or security.
In relation to the digital capabilities of Canada’s own national security agencies, these
new powers have been subject to criticism from academia, political, and civil rights groups in
Canada given the already unknown nature of CSE activities prior to C-59’s enactment (Nesbitt &
West, 2019; West, 2018). Furthermore, C-59 empowers CSE with the capacity to employ
cyberoperations that include disruption, sabotage, interference, and influence towards foreign
individuals, states, organizations, and terrorist groups as countermeasures against presumed
threats. These mandates have drawn heavy concern towards the future of warfare and explicit
condoning of state-sponsored hacking (West, 2018). Whereas it is becoming more important to
understand the rapidly changing threat environment that both foreign and domestic bodies have
on Canada’s national security, this digital arms race harkens back to the Cold War and the threat
that it has on unknowingly implicating Canadians in acts of war.
i. Microdeviations and Research Statement
Given the radical new powers granted to Canadian intelligence agencies through C-59,
the main aspect of this thesis is to propose assessing committee meetings and expert witness
supplemental briefs regarding C-59 through the recently developed Theory of Microdeviation
(Popham, 2018) and to provide an analysis on the relationship that the evolution of IoT
technology and the internet has alongside their growing integration amongst users against
traditionalist criminological perspectives that incorporates a technosocial perspective as
examined by Brown (2006) who devises the Criminology of Hybrids as thus:
Suppose criminology looked outside both the modern ‘nature-culture’ divide and the late
modern deconstructionist projects, and beyond the governmentalists’ highly social
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notions of technology, towards theories of the technosocial: the cyber, the data human,
the cybernetic and even the a-modern. What sort of contributions, what challenges, might
such theorizations make to analyses of crime, law and control? (p.711)
As such, this thesis will consider itself towards 3 objectives: How do expert witnesses
and government officials presenting to the House of Commons and Senate committees employ
narratives and evidence relative to manufactured uncertainty and national security threats online
to justify some of the possible disproportionate measures contained in Bill C-59? Second, given
the prevailing narratives towards modernization and futureproofing that informed C-59 and the
failures of provincial government attempts at controlling cyber-deviant behaviour online, does
the integration of Browns (2006) Criminology of Hybrids perspective have merit in explaining
how technosocial perspectives account for the melding of human and technology? The final
question will seek to ask; can the integration of Microdeviation Theory provide context on how
legislation informed by manufactured uncertainty may unknowingly breach Charter rights? As
described by Popham (2018), microdeviations entails the generation of manufactured uncertainty
about the internet and technology to facilitate the passing of legislation that is disproportionate
and overtly punishing towards implicated targets. This will include examining testimony made
by both expert witnesses and committee members focusing on the multitude of aspects
concerning the growing threat landscape online, Canadians general understanding of data privacy
and cyberthreats online, and testimony that considers the possibility of disproportionate
implications that these new powers in C-59 may have.
This application of Microdeviation Theory as it pertains to C-59 will allow the
examination of expert witness testimony that incorporates the normalization of digital threat
environments and the utilization of manufactured uncertainty towards the evolution of the
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internet and technology to justify legislation that can be disproportionate outside of what they
were meant to control. One such example can be seen in CSE’s (2019) report about foreign
interference towards Canada, notably how this primarily occurs through the dissemination of
materials through social media networks like Facebook and Twitter by use of bots and “troll
farms” to target voters and sway political behaviour in favor of disrupting democratic processes.
Whereas Popham (2018) introduced microdeviations into political discourse through actions
such as astroturfing campaigns to sway public opinion, this thesis will expand and test this theory
to account for how manufactured uncertainties about cyberspace can influence actors at the
federal level in proposing and rationalizing why certain aspects of C-59 are needed to better
modernize Canada’s national security agencies. As such, a defining aspect of this research entails
a unique perspective of examining the complexities of cybercrime taxonomy while also
advancing theoretical discussions on criminology’s larger role in examining the relationship
between technology and crime. As will be discussed in the forthcoming review of academic
literature, the main body of research surrounding C-59 and both IoT and social media
ecosystems generally will focus on the key implications to international relations (the law of selfdefence) and user-based susceptibility to foreign disinformation campaigns that circulate online
via social media. Furthermore, this review will also highlight how C-59’s path to royal assent
presents a gap in scholarly research concerning the application of technosocial perspectives and
Microdeviation Theory when considering how Federal legislation situates Canada’s current
threat environment.
Given the complex nature of this thesis, qualitative sources in information pertaining to
C-59 will be limited to the committee minutes and supplemental briefs that were submitted
during key debate sessions held to discuss how C-59 would proceed by having expert witnesses
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testify on matters pertaining to the bill’s development. These sources are readily archived and
obtainable through the Canadian Federal Governments website which will facilitate a nonobtrusive approach to examining the proposed research objectives contained here
(https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/SECU/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=9807256#D
T20171130SECUMEE88ID9807256). By focusing on these documents, it will be feasible to
examine pivotal moments in the leadup to C-59’s royal assent. And will highlight the intricacies
of the nature of modern digital threat landscapes and drafting effective legislation based on the
perspectives of leading experts in digital infrastructure.
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND
i. Introduction
This section of the thesis seeks to situate the perspectives that will be taken when
examining C-59. This background section will aim to provide relative context to the reader by
presenting sources that deal with difficulties that Canadian governments both federally and
provincially have encountered when implementing legislation concerning online behaviours.
Furthermore, scholarly critiques of the bill will be presented to demonstrate the primary concerns
of certain sections including government oversight and disproportionate consequences. Lastly,
this section will include scholarly sources that examine how digital media sources are often
subject to malicious attempts of distortion, divisiveness, and utilization of political extremist
groups to promote narratives and influence individuals online to promote anti social-justice
agendas.
ii. Canadian Legislative Responses
One of the most recent examples of cybercrime legislation concerns the repealing of
Nova Scotia’s provincial Cyber Safety Act. At issue here that to draft effective and constitutional
legislation regarding cyberbullying, its inherent definition must leave no room for multiple
interpretations as it can pose significant threats to Charter rights granted to citizens (Taylor,
2016). The core purpose of the Cyber Safety Act attempted to give a legislative definition to
cyberbullying, articulate when cyberbullying becomes an actionable offence, as well as provide
legislative remedies that victims could pursue against the accused. Taylor’s work in the subject
focused on the discussion from Justice McDougall’s 2015 ruling in Crouch v. Snell, which tested
the Cyber Safety Act’s constitutionality focusing on the bill’s overtly vague description of online
behaviours and its use of excessive penalties that far outstretched constitutional protections as
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per the Oakes test. For clarity, the Oakes test sets out whether a Federal or Provincial legislation
can withstand a section 1 challenge from the Canadian Charter. Section 1 of the Canadian charter
concerns itself with two scenarios; that the challenged legislation is objectively clear, and should
the legislation violate any Canadian Charter right, that the violation is as minimal as possible.
This is further highlighted when we consider the shift of how people interact with each-other
politically: a contemporary example concerns the recent Quebec City Mosque attack perpetuated
by Alexandre Bissonnette, who throughout his subsequent trial was found to have been
obsessively consuming large quantities of right-wing media online prior to committing the
shooting. Some of the content included material on President Donald Trump’s controversial
travel ban towards Muslims and Middle Eastern countries, and conspiracy theory/white
supremacist outlets that would often publish content depicting the apparent imposition of Sharia
Law on western nations (Riga, 2018). Like Crouch v. Snell in legislating cyberbullying
effectively, the case of Bissonnette has the potential to inquire about whether it’s possible within
constitutional grounds to legislate consumption behaviours online for the purposes of national
security and still withstand Charter challenges.
In their 2019 cyber threat report, CSE noted that Canada is very likely be targeted by
foreign nations through disruption campaigns that would seek to influence Canadian voters of
the then upcoming 2019 federal election through different facets of internet culture such as social
media feeds, forums, and published media content (p. 5). Although the implication of these
disinformation campaigns was anticipated to have a smaller affect compared to the 2016 U.S.
election misinformation campaign, CSE also noted that since their previous report in 2017 that
“political parties, candidates, and their staff have continued to be targeted worldwide by cyber
threat activity - though to a lesser extent than voters” (p. 5). Internationally, the report notes that
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of all cyber threat activity online, that approximately 88% of incidents recorded had been
strategically motivated, defined by the report that “threat actors specifically targeted a national
democratic process for the purpose of affecting the outcome” (p. 15).
The lead up to and post results of the 2019 Canadian Federal Election saw a variety of
crucial policies and subsequent reports that highlighted the need to be vigilant and adaptive to
the radically changing nature of the internet. This included the formation of the Security and
Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) task force to monitor and alert the public to significant
cyber threats against the election (Cain, 2019), the final drafting and royal assent of Bill C-59:
An Act Respecting National Security Matters (West, 2018) which included aforementioned
measures relating to cyber defence and formally established the mandate of the CSE, and the
subsequent reports that emerged post election that illustrated the various attempts at
manipulation campaigns towards Canadian voters. This included a report by Nexology that
examined computer bot behaviours in producing content targeting anxieties regarding
immigration and refugee status, the Canadian economy, as well as producing reactionary content
to generate inclusion of extremist ideologies across both sides of the political spectrum
(Forrester, Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019). Utilizing blacklists such as
www.propornot.com, a website that identifies sites that produce or propagate Russian
propaganda, one such finding identified bot accounts that “were pushing a largely leftward
(politically) leaning set of themes e.g. destroying organic farms or pro-Iranian and anti-Saudi
messages” (p. 7). The report further notes that whereas the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election saw
foreign agencies based in Russia utilize disinformation campaigns and social media manipulation
online in favor of then Presidential candidate Donald Trump, tactics used during the 2019
Canadian federal election instead sought to create voter disenfranchisement by propagating
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narratives online to create contestation between Canadian users and further generate apathy
towards democratic institutions.
iii. Scholarly Responses to Bill C-59
The threats that foreign state adversaries have and their capabilities towards leveraging
digital avenues such as the internet or the development of technological weaponry was a key
driver behind some of the more controversial aspects of C-59 when it was first introduced in
2017. The bill was met with controversy among legal scholars concerning the expansion of
powers granted to CSIS and CSE as it relates to online surveillance and signals intelligence
sharing with both domestic and international intelligence agreements (Nesbitt & West, 2019;
Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, & Deibert, 2017; Nesbitt, 2020). Regarding the expansion of
powers granted to CSE, the leading concern among scholars focuses on the integration of the
new active and defensive cyber operations that allow the agency to facilitate what has been
regarded as an enabling of “state-sponsored hacking” against global IT infrastructure and foreign
bodies (Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, & Deibert, 2017; West, 2018). Essentially, these
operations can include generating malware attacks against critical IPS infrastructure globally to
disrupt foreign aggressors as well as gathering massive amounts of data that is publicly available
or can be purchased via the commercial market, which carries with it the possibility of innocent
Canadians abroad being affected despite mandates specifically barring the agency from doing so.
Additionally, C-59 extends new powers to CSIS that effectively enable the agency to adopt a
more proactive approach in conducting sabotage campaigns against suspected individuals.
Concerns from scholars here focus on how CSIS can now (among other things) impersonate
others, plant evidence, and apply to limit certain Charter rights of individuals involved in
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investigations should the newly established Intelligence Commissioner Office (IO) approve the
application (West & Forcese, 2019).
Bill C-59 also implements new review measures by establishing the National Security
and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and giving it the power to oversee all mandates of
Canada’s intelligence agencies including CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP. However, this also resulted
in the closing of all potential avenues for public review. C-59 serves as a replacement to the
previous national security act, C-51, which at the time was mired in controversy to anti-terrorism
measures such as the isolating of each agencies review bodies from collaboration when their
respective agencies engaged in collaborative investigations (Roach & Forcese, 2015). In their
critique of C-51, Roach and Forcese (2015) note that previous review bodies were only capable
of reviewing the conduct of their respective agency and were unable to conduct joint
investigations such as when the RCMP would work with CSIS on potential domestic terrorism
cases. This resulted in gaps between annual reviews since the collaborative nature between
agencies would stifle inquiries when parts of investigations were handed off to another agency.
While the addition of the NSIRA was a key benefit, the coupling of these new (and vaguely
defined) powers against the backdrop of public internet privacy and a growing digital threat
landscape have influenced why these concerns are so prevalent with C-59’s wording.
iv. Disinformation and Sabotage in a Digital Era
The implementation of C-59 poses a unique opportunity to examine how governmental
perceptions of the growing number of internet-borne threats have begun to shift in response to
recent encroachments into Canadian digital infrastructures, such as the growing global awareness
about disinformation campaigns (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Furthermore, the status of C-59 and
its royal assent put fourth questions about how the use of seemingly benign internet platforms
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such as Facebook and Twitter were utilized in the 2016 U.S. presidential race by Russia to target
and disrupt critical voter states to secure the election of Donald J. Trump (McCombie, Uhlmann,
& Morrison, 2019). In other words, a key revelation notes how the increasing perversion of
social media, other internet platforms, or devices being connected online as an avenue to all
facets of information for an individual can expose them to misinformation campaigns online
while also expanding avenues to threats online as critical infrastructures become increasingly
dependent on the internet for connectivity.
Whereas C-51 has been regarded as being a political response towards the two terrorist
attacks that saw the death of two CAF members on Parliament Hill and the Saint-Jean surRichelieu terrorist ramming (Nesbitt, 2020; Roach & Forcese, 2015), C-59 was touted by
government representatives as modernizing Canada’s national security agencies via the
expansion of digital powers to their mandates to be better equipped against internet-borne attacks
from threats both foreign and domestic. It is important to note here however, that the proposed
research itself is not concerned with providing a critical analysis of whether the new and
expanded powers contained in C-59 are warranted. Rather, this thesis will assess how the
utilization of extreme cases of internet and social media manipulation alongside contemporary
threat environments and the rapidly evolving digitalized societies has influenced the reactionary
nature of Bill C-59.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
i. Introduction
The following chapter aims to integrate a sufficient catalogue of the prevailing scholarly
work related to the multitude of subject matter considering both cyber-deviant behaviours and
Canada’s own national security strategies. This includes prior scholarly work that considers the
role that social media and IoT technology have when used to conduct attacks both foreign and
domestically against national security interests. Further, this chapter will also provide an account
of existing research that considers differing forms of governance towards multiple aspects of
online cultures and contemporary technology. This includes attempts made by provincial
governments towards controlling the impacts of cyberbullying and C-59’s predecessor C-51 that
saw the expansion of powers granted to Canada’s NSAs when considering the collection and
exploitation of digitalized datasets for the purpose of maintaining security. To conclude, this
chapter will examine existing literature that focuses on Canada’s Supreme Court interpretations
to the protection of privacy online as well as existing scholarly work surrounding digital privacy
in a rapidly evolving society.
ii. Digital Content Manipulation and Sabotage Online
As popular social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter continue to dominate
the global market as a primary source of information and livelihood for its majority of users, the
threats posed by disinformation campaigns and content manipulation online will continue to be
an issue that will become more difficult to control. Scholarly efforts typically examine the uptick
in users accessing social media platforms or forum-based webpages and how users increasingly
interact with one another digitally (Massanari, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). One example
concerns how Twitter can become a hosting ground to manipulation or conflict between users
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that can often draw serious implications outside of the platform. This has included recent events
such as the #gamergate incident that saw a countercultural revolt against a perceived lack of
ethics in video game journalism culminate in attacks on feminism activists as well as minority
game developers, reporters, and reviewers alike (Massanari, 2017; Nagle, 2017). Additionally,
recent developments surrounding social media’s involvement in disinformation campaigns to
sabotage the 2019 Canadian Federal Elections were also examined, which found that foreign
interference campaigns were being conducted through bot campaigns that sought to aggravate
wedge issues discussed online to allow foreign actors to operate with less resistance in their
objectives (Forrester, Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019). Among others, these examples
are illustrative of the rise in digital movements online reflective of political groups across the
broader ideological spectrum or reactionary movements that classified as forms of “culture” or
“flame” wars online (Nagle, 2017).
Regarding disinformation campaigns carried out by right-leaning groups, these conflicts
have almost exclusively played out online, with the tactics that right-leaning and other
reactionary groups use involving “hacks” that capitalize on the interactive design of social media
users to recruit likeminded individuals on issues including social justice and racism (Lewis,
2018). Lewis defines such movements as being part of “alternative influence networks” whereby
users will typically be drawn into extreme-leaning political online subcultures by framing social
justice activities as direct attacks against the individual’s culture and identity. Lewis (2018)
further elaborates on how this digital network can effectively serve as a gateway to narratives of
extreme racism and right-wing ideology by linking or networking multiple social media formats
together along similar concepts. Actors in this network include notable white supremacist
Richard Spencer, YouTube/Podcast host David Crowder, and conservative pundit Ben Shapiro

MICRODEVIATIONS AND BILL C:59

SLIGHT 23

among others (Nagle, 2017). To distance their own platforms from traditional media outlets,
actors within this network will attempt to convey a unique sense of authenticity that distance
themselves from “mainstream media outlets”. By engaging in these types of activities, Lewis
(2018) notes that this allows for the actor to impart content towards their audiences that attempt
to persuade them of popular right-wing narratives such as racial inequality towards Caucasians,
vehemently oppose feminism, as well as “standing up” against social policies perpetuated by
social justice warriors or in worse cases, people of the Jewish faith. However, these users do not
typically pursue these agendas through normative means. Rather, users will often engage in
banal behaviours such as posting tweets or generating forum posts that espouse their antagonistic
beliefs against movements perceived as being progressive. Groups noted by Lewis and Marwick
(2017) to also engage in online disinformation campaigns have included men’s rights activists,
conspiracy theorists such as Alex Jones, and users of the popular forum page 4chan. This is
partly in fact that while they may align on certain issues such as being against perceived
progressive policies, these groups have been vehemently opposed to ideological narratives others
may have such as white nationalism or anti-Semitism (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Regardless,
actors involved in far-right talking points or foreign interference will typically produce or
manipulate content that serves their own (or combined) objectives to “game” social media
algorithms and search engines alike that will allow the communication of these narratives to
internet users (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Nagle, 2017). By manipulating social media and search
engine algorithms, actors in this network can artificially inflate the popularity of certain
keywords or devise “viral” hashtag movements that allow for the content to appear prominently
on other users’ feeds. An example of this comes from the #gamergate incident whereby far-right
actors utilized the hashtag to drive discussion and harassment online. By driving the popularity
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of this hashtag, Marwick and Lewis (2017) articulate how it became a digital unifying keyword
relative to organizing online campaigns. Considering these movements however, traditional
media outlets fail to provide coverage to these campaigns as companies struggle to adapt to the
changing media monetization online. Whereas extremist groups online have flourished, media
companies often struggle to gain a foothold into the online market due to economic factors
including a lack of trust among consumers and loss of advertising revenue to other free access
sites such as Craigslist (Lewis, 2017). As such, smaller media outlets will often fold or be
absorbed into larger media families that would rather focus on generating relatable content to a
casual audience at the cost of providing more grounded and accurate coverage to viewers.
While the use of internet bots or campaigns to game trending algorithms is used by both
right leaning and foreign government actors, this is not the only way to propagate specific
agendas online. The utilization of digital new outlets, meme culture, and content specific forums
are also used in tandem to manipulate media sources online (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Forrester,
Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019). Marwick & Lewis (2017) examined how far-right
actors may engage in content manipulation to influence forms of ‘agenda setting’, whereby the
goal of having manipulated content be covered does not concern the fact of whether the story is
eventually debunked, but to simply have the content reported on and gain exposure in the first
place. This has usually been achieved by having content driven “up the chain” of prominent
news sources by initially planting a manipulated story in a smaller media outlet with lax fact
checking procedures, in hopes that larger outlets will subsequently pick up the story (p. 38). An
example of driving fake content to national coverage includes the case of “White Student Union”
Facebook pages that were fabricated by white nationalist outlet The Daily Stormer founder
Andrew Anglin with the hopes of having the groups covered nationally thereby potentially
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having university students join their movement (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). This technique is not
limited to fake content, and far-right actors have also driven narratives on factual content by
specifically framing the story in certain ways to promote their agendas. Marwick & Lewis (2017)
note that when presented with evidence contradictory to their own beliefs, far-right actors will
typically “double-down” on their own beliefs and set out to push a false narrative to their groups
or audience to demonstrate their authenticity to others. Furthermore, the prevalence of meme
culture and specific content forums such as 4chan have also been utilized with other
disinformation techniques in publishing far-right narratives. The accessibility of meme culture
can facilitate the least resistance in fabricating a viral campaign as they are concise in their
objective and can be easily shared among others within or outside the group (Marwick & Lewis,
2017). Forums such as those found on The Daily Stormer and 4chan have often hosted specific
days whereby users are encouraged to develop memes that can then be shared by other users on
their own social media pages thus generating visibility on trending topics. Relative to
microdeviation, digital content manipulation highlights not only the difficulties that media
companies face to provide accurate and effective coverage, but also with how social media
platforms and underlying services including content algorithms are subjected to hacks outside of
their anticipated use.
Compared to political groups online, actors involved in foreign interference campaigns
deviate slightly in their goals insofar as groups have been found to engage in reactionary politics
online, but with the underlying purpose of distracting authentic users from other pertinent issues
while also advancing acceptance towards the nation states foreign policy goals such as
underscoring a populations belief in the integrity of democratic institutions (Bradshaw &
Howard, 2018; Forrester, Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019). Concerning the broader
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international goals of these foreign campaigns, Bradshaw and Howard (2018) note that foreign
adversaries will also hijack traditional social media technologies to employ the use of “soft
power and persuasion, framing and agenda setting, ideological hegemony, symbolic power, or
sharp power to achieve desired outcomes” (p.25). Drawing from the Computational Propaganda
Project in 2017, they also note that depending on the type of regime (Democracy, Authoritarian,
or Crisis State), the type of model actors carrying out disinformation campaigns can be
identified. Regarding Authoritarian and Crisis States, Bradshaw and Howard note that
governmental ministries such as cyber troops working for the Internet Research Agency in
Russia are typically charged with carrying out disinformation campaigns to protect cyber
infrastructure and content. Whereas Democratic states often saw members of political parties as
the main actors conducting disinformation campaigns, typically carried out against domestic
populations during government elections.
Another issue with determining foreign actors’ involvement in social media
disinformation campaigns concerns problems with the victim state’s capability towards
identifying the location of where disinformation attacks originate. Whereas noted before about
how political groups online will typically broadcast themselves on social media publicly, foreign
actors or “cyber-troops” are generally publicly funded but discrete actors or groups that utilize
anonymizing technology such as Virtual Private Network’s or The Onion Router to accomplish
misinformation campaigns across state boundaries (Forrester, Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya,
2019; Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). In Canada, reports developed shortly after the conclusion of
the 2019 Federal Election offered evidence of Russian interference, albeit at a lesser degree
compared to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, that sought to utilize social media platforms
online to drive wedge issues amongst Canadians to ‘distract’ Canadians from other Russian
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misinformation campaigns (p. 11). Utilizing the BEND Framework, specific strategies by
Russian botnets and troll farms had been found to promote misinformation campaigns on core
Canadian politic issues including ethical considerations, climate change, as well as the Alberta
Tar Sands. For this study, the authors note that “each letter of BEND corresponds to one
quadrant produced by the combination of the two axis” (p. 2). Based on existing research on
disinformation and Russian information manoeuvres, the reports author’s state the BEND
Framework “describes strategies that can be used by actors in the information environment” and
that “information activities are characterised along two axis: community manipulation versus
content manipulation and positive manipulation versus negative manipulation” (Forrester,
Bacovcin, Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019, p. 2). How these objectives were achieved typically
focused on how the bots were utilized to provide positive or negative support to these issues to
create division among Canadian social media users by promoting conflict online.
iii. Internet Regulation & Governance, Cyberattacks & Self-Defence
As attacks originating on the internet become more commonplace and accessible to
motivated parties, an issue for legislative bodies concerns the capability of the state to adequately
develop legal frameworks that are appropriate to the threat that internet-borne attacks harbor.
Given the many resources available online to facilitate anonymity, attacks that leverage the
internet are often difficult to trace an exact location when the perpetrator masks their location
data through multiple networks globally (Stahl, 2012). Even when an attacker’s location can be
traced, investigations can face complications when cyber-aggressors reside in foreign countries
whose own governments are unsupportive towards international jurisdictions such as the
deportation of the suspected parties to the victim state to face prosecution (Couzigou, 2014).
Despite these issues, the use of existing international treaties is often hailed to be the most
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productive avenue to pursuing restitution from cyberattacks and it can be demonstrated that the
attack originated from a foreign state or individual.
In the absence of international ad hoc treaty regulations towards the cyber dimension,
scholars advocate for the use of existing treaties and customary law to outline governance on
matters pertaining to cyberattacks. At the time of this writing, 2001’s Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime (otherwise known as The Budapest Convention) is currently the only
legally binding instrument of international law that addresses criminal activity in cyberspace
with only 61 states having signed and ratified the treaty (Van Dine, 2020). Coming into force in
June 2004, the treaty directs signatory states to “criminalize certain cyber offences in their
domestic legislation, to extend their jurisdiction to offences originating from their territory or
committed by their nationals, and to provide mutual assistance in investigations and
prosecutions” (p. 19). While the Convention specifies prohibited conduct online, it becomes the
responsibility of the signatory states to provide the elements of prohibited conduct and the most
efficient route to enforcement of each state’s domestic laws (Stahl, 2012). What the Convention
does not achieve however, is the formal establishing of universal procedures towards prosecution
and punishment for any given act. Instead, the Convention relies on the international cooperation
of signatory states to assist in the enforcement of domestic law. For example, public and private
sectors of Estonia suffered a devastating cyberattack that stretched several weeks following the
removal of a post WWII monument commemorating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in
the town of Tallinn (Stahl, 2012). The attack included the use of a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDOS), whereby malware infected computers are leveraged to send “a massive series of data
packets to the targeted networks” overloading the operational capacity of Estonia’s computer
networks and shutting them down (p. 256). Given how the Estonian government relies heavily on
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the internet for daily operations, the sabotage caused significant damages to the country
including widespread unrest and rioting as critical government services were rendered obsolete
in the aftermath of the attack. Following the supposed identification of the attacks originating
within Russia, Stahl (2012) notes that “although the Estonian government claims to have proof
that the earliest attacks originated from Russian government computers, the nature of a DDOS
attack makes determining the original source of the attack difficult” (p. 257). Further
complicating the investigation concerned the Russian government’s refusal to help locate and
prosecute the individuals involved, which Stahl (2012) argues to show how an international
approach is needed to mandate the cooperation of implicated states towards investigations that
cross international boundaries especially as cyberattacks can be deployed seemingly anywhere.
Following a request for military aid from NATO in responding to the attack, it was found that
some of the hackers involved were not based in Russia and were based in Brazil and Vietnam
(Gable, 2010). The initial reluctance to assist Estonia in identifying a possible suspect by Russia
can be interpreted as reflective of the broader issue facing international efforts to combat
cyberattacks. Given the Convention’s few signatories or recognition of reflecting customary
international norms, Stahl (2012) argues that “a victimized nation attempting to prosecute
attackers residing in a country that is not party to the Convention will have to rely on an
independent agreement in order to pursue criminal charges against perpetrators located within
the non-member state’s borders” (p. 264). This means that without bilateral acceptance of the
Convention between the 2 states involved, the victim state would be forced to resort to criminal
prosecution under the origin states jurisdiction and is not guaranteed as the nebulous nature of
the term “cyber” may not be considered criminal for prosecution such as in the Philippines
(Gable, 2010).
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Attempts to help deter cyberattacks against critical infrastructures in the literature focus
on the application of an international legal framework similar to UN treaties such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which governs legal relationships related
to the sea such as the sovereign states duty to combat piracy outside of their own jurisdictions
(Stahl, 2012; Gable, 2010). Given how the Convention only outlines directives to signatory states
to cooperate and implement domestic legislation on prohibited cyber-conduct, international
agreements rely on the ‘Martens Clause’ to adapt existing international law towards the cyberdimension. Contained in Article 1(2) of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, it
states that:
[i] n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience
This means that in the development of new warfare technologies that are not prohibited explicitly
by international treaties does not expressly permit their lawful usage. Rather, the clause can be
used as an extension of existing prohibition or regulations towards new weaponry to avoid gaps
in legislation (Van Dine, 2020). However, Van Dine (2020) contests that the application of this
clause towards cyberoperations “is that they do not take into account their uniqueness and might
prove to be too general” (p. 23). This is largely due to how Martens Clause also facilitates the
extension of existing treaties notion that imply the existence of territory or geographical borders
that fall under state sovereignty, whereas cyberspace can be inherently borderless and subject to
constant change.
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While some nations have become better equipped to allow their citizens the ability to use
the internet relatively safely, establishing effective regulations becomes increasingly problematic
as these same nations often hold conflicting views on appropriate responses to disruptions
(Kierkegaard, 2005). Further complicating an international agreement on the regulation of the
internet is that by its own nature, the internet itself is something that does not have a singular,
authoritative body and can transcend international boundaries or laws. While some international
agreements do exist in differing capacities, organizations such as the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
primarily deal in matters relative to URL domain registration or formulating technical standards
for information and communication technology respectively (Take, 2012). Regarding
international relations, it is often noted that the influence a nation carries with it will generally
influence how foreign governments will react when a citizen or group residing in their borders is
sought for damages (Take, 2012). Given its capabilities, drafting policy relative to cyberattacks
conducted in foreign locations requires a form of legitimacy between stakeholders and can be
exercised during the entire process of outlining international internet regulation between
governments. Take (2012) describes three processes that influence the legitimacy that a
government holds during policy drafting/implementation which includes the input, throughput,
and output legitimacy, and the success of cybercrime policy between nations rests on the strength
of the normative and empirical legitimacy an international information technology regulator has
during each three processes. Take (2012) defines the “input” measure of legitimacy to the effect
of how involved all relevant stakeholders in policy matters are included in the decision-making
process, the “throughput” legitimacy refers to the accountability of the decisionmakers involved,
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and the “output” legitimacy measure as the ability of governance arrangements power in
convincing internal and external stakeholders to accept regulations.
Further concerns relative to international governance on information technology rest on
policies implemented through the United Nations including laws that govern how cyberattacks
can breach a nation’s sovereignty and whether they satisfy conditions to warrant self-defence.
The capabilities of augmenting or developing original attacks through the internet can allow
interested actors to launch attacks virtually to precise locations while facilitating anonymity of
their own location ultimately hindering state retaliation (Couzigou, 2014). Furthermore, given
the growing complex nature of the internet and its affordance in anonymity, it has become
increasingly difficult for victim states to claim that the perpetrators were directed by state
authority to conduct the attacks. Plausible circumstances imposed by international law that
hinder investigations include providing evidence that the actor was situated within the foreign
state, the individual or group was empowered by that state government (typically through
legislation), or the individual was acting under the instruction, direction, or control of the state
(Couzigou, 2014; Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). The international law to self-defence, located in
article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the lack of a written description of what categorizes force is
oftentimes debated as to its function relative to cybercrime (West, 2018). Furthermore, problems
arise when attempting to incorporate cybercriminal acts as either ‘instrument-based’ or
‘consequence-based’ models of force, as the utility of an IT system can potentially fall into either
category. Couzigou (2014) argues that the user of IT devices in attacks ought to be classified as a
form of consequence-based use of force, as this allows a wider degree of interpretation when
clarifying cybercriminal behaviour as either an act of armed force or an armed attack. While the
use of an IT device is required, the consequential effects of the attack would require serious

MICRODEVIATIONS AND BILL C:59

SLIGHT 33

consideration as to whether it would be classified as a state enabled use of force or attack and
thus warrant self-defence.
iv. Digital Privacy & The Charter
The purpose of this section in the literature review will aim to provide a comprehensive
summary of scholarly works that examine Canadian courts and jurisprudence towards the role of
digital privacy amid growing state surveillance and new avenues towards data harvesting via a
proliferation of devices becoming increasingly connected to the internet. This includes a brief
overview of scholarly works that examine s.8’s expansion into a digital era via a variety of case
decisions and whether the Charter is adaptable to growing technologies. This section will also
examine the expansion of state powers for national security purposes via ‘big data’ surveillance,
otherwise known as metadata, and its controversial nature towards digital privacy. This includes
examining the recent ruling against CSIS concerning their “Operational Data Analysis Center”
(ODAC), a bulk metadata analysis program that had been in operation since at least 2006.
Finally, this section will conclude by examining the role of IoT technology as it pertains to
individual security risks and the normalized diminishing of privacy rights online as modern
technology devices become increasingly connected to the internet.
While the right to informational privacy is not explicitly enshrined in the Charter, it has
been given constitutional status in Canada via the expansion of certain rights pertaining to the
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure (s.8). Earliest interpretations to s.8 were
situated on jurisprudence that focused on the protection of property rather than the individual,
and it wasn’t until Hunter v. Southam (1984) that s.8 transitioned to be reflective of “people not
places” and that the interest at stake was against privacy, not property (Austin, 2007). Austin
(2007) further notes that this decision helped to set s.8 jurisprudence “within a framework
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suitable for the modern world, where the paradigm for unjustified state intrusions into individual
lives is not the knock of the king's messengers at one's” (p. 499). Further cases heard by the
Supreme Court refined the decision in determining what types of information trigger s.8
protection such as R v. Plant (1993) that introduced the concept of a “biological core” defined as
information “which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and
control from dissemination to the state” (p. 283). These two decisions predicated other decisions
that would shape s.8 jurisprudence in Canada for subsequent decades. Against the backdrop of
emerging technologies afforded to state surveillance however, scholarly opinion towards the
effectiveness of s.8 jurisprudence in protecting individual privacy interests is mixed. While
Austin (2012) argues that jurisprudence towards s.8 protections highlight a lack of effectiveness
against emerging forms of surveillance, she considers the notion that privacy interests against
state surveillance following Southam and Plant as being “absolute” and its infringement ends the
policy debate rather than it being a part of the broader conversation in public policy. She
advocates that traditional rule of law interpretations that only address “reasonable expectations”
of privacy have worked to narrow its applicability and allow the unfettered expansion of state
surveillance powers rather than constrain it. To illustrate this, she notes R v. Gomboc (2010),
which saw the courts side with the state on permitting the surveillance of electrical usage
patterns via a digital recording ammeter (DRA) as the accused had not requested their utility
company to refrain from sharing their data with law enforcement. In this case, the courts had
affirmed that privacy interests were not infringed as the accused had not exercised their ability to
have their data kept confidential which Austin (2012) argues had failed to consider other
elements to the rule of law including the ability for the state to simply enact legislation that make
the intrusion lawful. In contrast, Conrod (2019) notes that while s.8 jurisprudence has afforded
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the right tools to protecting individual privacy interests, these decisions have failed to provide
certainty or predictability when dealing with the rapidly growing technological environment. She
cites the competing deliberations made by justices on the Supreme Court in Gomboc on what
constitutes information relative to the “biographical core” when utilizing surveillance technology
such as the DRA as creating confusion amongst lower courts when applying the same tests to
determining whether a method used warrants s.8 protections. To counteract this, Conrod (2019)
proposes that a spectrum of privacy protection specifically dealing with technology be
considered when determining s.8 breaches of state investigations. Given the rapidly evolving
nature in technology both new or developing, privacy interests occur at varying degrees when
using them and can allow the courts to better follow a case-by-case basis when balancing them
against the surveillance methods used by the state in their investigations.
Following the Snowden revelations, it became increasingly clear just how critical a role
“big data surveillance” (BDS) has in the facilitation of national security operations despite its
controversial nature as it relates to digital privacy. Whilst most documents leaked pertain to the
United States’ National Security Agency, Canada’s own national security agencies were
implicated in findings that indicated international cooperation amongst other allied Five-Eyes
agencies in conducting big data surveillance sparking public outcry (Lyon, 2015). Big data
surveillance refers to the “control over collection, storage, and processing infrastructures in order
to accumulate and mine spectacularly large amounts of data for useful patterns” (Andrejevic &
Gates, 2014, p. 190). Emerging from the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, big data
surveillance represents a shift in national security agencies investigations from being deliberately
targeted against individuals of interest towards a broader, proactive approach that seeks to
harvest as much data online as possible and work inward. This form of surveillance involves the
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use of secretive programs that at times require the cooperation of public and private sectors
including internet providers in collecting data no matter the relevancy to investigations (Laurin,
2020). Prior to the Snowden revelations little was known about the existence or capabilities of
these programs, but Lyon (2015) notes that the revelations had brought secretive programs to
light and that their true capabilities far exceeded scholarly concerns. Examples of techniques
used by agencies include the use of interceptors, which are placed along cable routes to facilitate
mass data collection for future analysis including ‘Levitation’, a program used by CSE to gather
data from up to 15 million downloads from file sharing websites (Lyon, 2015). At the centre of
big data surveillance concerns the usage of specific anonymized portions of metadata, and while
it holds substantial value in the success of proactive national security agencies internationally,
it’s utility in identifying individuals based on algorithmic inferences has been noted by scholars
as being detrimental to both human and privacy rights (Lyon, 2015; Laurin, 2020). Metadata
represents anonymized digital footprints that one creates when browsing the internet or using
telecommunication devices and can be exploited by metadata harvesting programs for national
security purposes including the identification of potential individuals of interest (Lyon, 2015;
Roach & Forcese, 2015). Examples of metadata that can be used for national security purposes
include vehicle identification numbers, telecommunication timestamps including the date, time,
and general location of where the call occurred. A prominent argument against the use of
metadata in national security concerns how the previously mentioned expansion of BDS
techniques have been reframed by government agencies as being lawful despite the secrecy in
how BDS is carried out (Austin, 2015; Laurin, 2020). Following the Snowden leaks, Austin
(2015) argues that the secrecy in which national security agencies engage in BDS precludes any
insight into whether these programs conform to the rule of law. Defined as ‘lawful illegality’, she
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further argues “the problem is that the plausible legal interpretation is one provided by the
government itself and its conclusion of lawfulness is far from obvious to an outside observer” (p.
107). In the case of the ODAC decision against CSIS, Laurin (2020) notes that the agency may
have potentially engaged in misleading federal oversight parties about the true potential of the
metadata harvesting program, and that by using carefully selected terminology it had deterred
any investigation as to whether the irrelevant data subject to exploitation had been kept legally.
Outside of Canadian court jurisprudence and Charter protections, another element
surrounding digital privacy concerns itself with previous statements made here towards the
evolving ecosystem of IoT technology, social media platforms, and growing state capabilities to
conducting digital surveillance facilitated via the expansion of internet access internationally.
This includes scholarly discussions towards the growing accessibility of SMART technology and
how permissions needed to facilitate the use of their features has been increasingly encroaching
Canadian privacy interests online. Considering the evolving capabilities of traditional technology
and the integration of SMART features, recent advancements in this space have created new
avenues including both in convenience to the user as well as new methods to data harvesting.
Regarding the IoT, Maras (2015) notes that “in its the most basic sense, the IoT refers to the
connection of everyday objects (eg TVs, appliances, and exercise equipment) to the Internet. It
enables the real-time monitoring and vast collection of data about property, people, plants, and
animals” (p.99). The connection of traditional technology to the internet provides a multitude of
benefits that include the ability to remotely control products such as HVAC systems, real-time
monitoring of health such as the use of fitness trackers, as well as the ability to monitor vital
signs in medical settings such as the integration of the internet to radiological machines, all of
which can be connected to any Wi-Fi or cable access points. Maras (2015) further notes that the
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prevalence of IoT technology has also afforded the ability for “machine to machine” (M2M)
communications, whereby devices are able to “translate data according to context and make
relevant, timely, and valuable decisions based on readings” (p.100). Important to note here
however, is that these seemingly tangible benefits towards efficiency have also come with a
substantial cost, namely, that most IoT technology is developed without security or privacy in
mind and prone to exploitation (Conrod, 2019; Maras, 2015). These costs can include the lack of
proper security measures in medical equipment (allowing backdoor access and manipulation) or
existing vulnerabilities of these devices that can be breached remotely causing substantial losses.
Canada’s own intelligence agencies have also noted this trend, as recent reports have indicated
that the growing integration of Canada’s critical infrastructures to the internet have also opened
avenues for aggressors to conduct sabotage virtually via the use of malware including
ransomware towards hospitals or electrical grids (CSE, 2018; CSE, 2019). Additionally, as more
devices become integrated into the IoT, they can have severe impacts towards the expectations of
privacy that users may have when using products but are forced to do so to continue their usage
of certain products (Conrod, 2019).
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METHODS
i. Introduction
For this study, the qualitative data analysis (QDA) methodology as outlined by Saldana
(2014) was employed to analyze Canada’s national security relating to digital threats in the
current threat environment. This included the preliminary identification of datasets and gathering
relevant materials to assist in sourcing archival datasets that would be appropriate for qualitative
data analysis. Following the review of Canada’s process in developing/implementing legislation
and reviewing other similar bodies of research focusing on Canadian legislation, the committee
meeting’s transcribed testimonials and submissions that preceded the ‘locking in’ of C-59’s
overall structure and mandate were identified as the primary source of qualitative data to this
research project given that these meetings had utilized expert witnesses in occupational roles that
were of interest to national security objectives. Per the then Public Safety Minster Hon. Ralph
Goodale, C-59’s deliberations were highlighted to be given special interest that allowed the bill’s
scope to be modified between the first and second readings instead of only being locked after the
first reading. Since these transcribed meetings and briefs are digital in nature and can be readily
found online via the Government of Canada’s website for Parliament
(https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/en/bill/42-1/C-59), it was determined that these archival
documents be examined. This methodology afforded this thesis the capability to procure
qualitative datasets in a non-intrusive manner, thus facilitating the ability to revisit past datasets
for reflection, re-coding, and early analysis pertinent to Microdeviation theory and technosocial
implications.
The justifications for utilizing qualitative data analysis in this research can be found both
in Saldana’s (2014) own methodology and other scholarly contributions to conducting QDA, as
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well as through demonstration of prior scholarly research that has focused on both Bill C-59’s
earlier legislative drafts and prior provincial attempts to legislate certain cyber elements of crime
including cyberbullying. The integration of QDA for the purpose of this thesis allows for an
intimate approach to exploring the vast amounts of testimony and submissions that were made
pertaining to C-59 and identifying nuances that contributed toward establishing the mechanisms
present within the bill. As Saldana (2014) has referred to in his various publications on QDA,
integrating this methodology affords constant revisiting, refining, and analytic foresight.
Qualitative analysis can explore possible implications of microdeviations on a national (and at
times, international) scope. Finally, the utilization of QDA for the purpose of this thesis will also
allow for a far more expansive commentary on the technosocial implications that can arise from
this seemingly apparent “digitalized arms race” that could not effectively be integrated into a
quantitative study.
In other scholarly publications, qualitative methodologies were also used to examine both
the preliminary implications of C-59’s new powers as well as other provincial attempts at
legislating cyber elements of crime, notably with cyberbullying. During the initial unveiling and
early discussions surrounding C-59’s terminology, West (2018) integrated the legislation’s
earlier drafts, public official commentary on the bill, as well as archival publications of CSE
activities abroad. These data were contained in the Snowden revelations and identify the
international implications of cyberactivity authorization as it pertains to the United Nations
Charter concerning civilian rights, compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and
the resulting possibility of retaliation from other member states towards cyberoperations that
could implicate the civilian agency as war combatants. Additionally, Parsons et al. (2017) on
behalf of Citizen Lab had also researched and published their first report concerning the new
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powers to be implemented in C-59. This report was submitted to the Committee for
consideration on proposed amendments to C-59 and other priority aspects of the legislation
needing to be addressed. In their report, Citizen Lab focused on the new mandates being
proposed in the CSE Act of the legislation as well as the review powers being implemented with
the integration of the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The lab’s
objectives were achieved primarily through a comparative analysis of C-59 to other previous
national security acts including the bills predecessor that was enacted by the Conservative
government, Bill C-51. A final study concerning the Provincial Government of Nova Scotia’s
legislative attempts to combat cyberbullying by Taylor (2016) had also utilized similar
qualitative methods and data sources to provide a qualitative case study on the abrupt striking
down of the Cyber Safety Act. This study included the analysis of the judicial decision
surrounding the growing complexities of legislating digitalized behaviour as the commentary
from striking the Cyber Safety Act noted that the protection of Section 2 Charter rights extended
as well to communications made online.
ii. Sample Identification
For this study, the recorded committee meeting minutes available to the public on the
Canadian Parliament website were selected as they provide accurate accounts of both the
selected expert witnesses as well as cross examinations by the members of parliament that
comprised the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
(https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/SECU/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=9807256#D
T20171130SECUMEE88ID9807256). This resulted in 16 committee meetings that were then
imported to NVIVO and subject to a narrative assessment by querying key terminology relative
to the digital and social elements contained in C-59. This brief assessment of the testimonies
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contained in the meetings allowed for a filtering out of unnecessary reports where their contents
held no substantial value to the overall goals of this study. In total, 13 dates where meetings were
held by the committee split into two 2 ½ hour blocks for a total of 26 hearings were identified as
relevant for the study. Following the acquisition of the relevant meetings to this study, the briefs
that were submitted by the expert witnesses that testified were also collected and added to the
NVIVO project for coding and analysis. The primary reason for their inclusion is entirely
supplemental, as the briefs contain a more in-depth qualitative focus to their respective proposals
revising C-59 and any forthcoming concerns of certain legislative powers that informed the
ensuing analysis of this study. With the little time that is allotted to both members of the
committee to examine expert witnesses and how briefly at times testimony may be, examinations
on certain digital matters of C-59 were often cut short of a definitive answer. However, what was
often the case when this occurred was that witnesses were asked to supplement their briefs
provided to the committee with more detailed responses for the committee’s consideration. In
total, 10 text briefs were submitted by expert witnesses that provided a much more expansive
insight on their respective proposals to legislation amendments and concerns relative to the
digital elements of the bill. These datasets were then stored on a USB drive with frequent
uploading to a OneDrive to ensure data integrity and prevent accidental deletion.
These datasets were then subject to an initial coding procedure with codes that were predetermined based on both the tenants of Microdeviation Theory and supplemental codes that
were derived from concepts contained in the scholarly sources used in the preceding literature
review as shown in Figure 3.1:
Charter Rights
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References that focus on how legislation
concerning cyber measures affect Charter
Rights.
Concerns Relative to Individual Privacy
Balancing privacy concerns to national
References that consider matters relative to an
security
individual’s privacy stakes and how national
security mandates may affect it.
Privacy of Canadians from Cyber Search /
References to testimony focusing on
Seizure
protecting Canadians from cyber-searches in
the context of national security investigations.
Canadian Metadata Complexities
References that focus on matters pertaining to
metadata and its usage in national security
investigations (including justifications for its
continued use).
Cyberoperations
Defensive Cyberoperations
References that focus on the DEFENSIVE
capabilities of cyberoperations, and any other
references that include the term.
Offensive Cyberoperations
References that focus on the OFFENSIVE
capabilities of cyberoperations, and any other
references that include the term.
Cyber Cold War
References that consider concerns of a
growing 'Cyber Cold War' from enabling
cyberoperations.
General Descriptors RE: Internet
Canadian National Security Responses
Includes references that focus on testimony or
Compared to Five Eyes Allies
questioning that situates Canada's national
security responses to that of other Five Eyes
allies.
Cyberconflicts on the World Stage
Include references relative to:
a) "The New Cold War"
b) Warfare categorized as being fought on
keyboards instead of traditional weaponry
c) International incidents involving the use of
digital technology (i.e., Stuxnet)
Internet as an Emerging New Threat to
References that contain matters of the internet
Canadian National Security
as becoming more novel in its use towards
conducting cyber-attacks, recruitment,
disinformation etc.
International Implications
Civilian agencies as an extension of the
References that allude to the implications of
military
civilian agencies and their operatives as
actants of war.
Cyberoperations as a breach of international References to how legislating cyberoperations
boundaries
can breach international boundaries and
potentially be regarded as acts of war.
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Microdeviations
Normalization of Digital Deviancy &
References that use terminology or outright
Annoyances
explanations that situate elements of
internet/technology as being normalized such
as diminishing privacy interests to continue
using certain products, or the willingness to
accept disinformation online as a part of the
contemporary internet structure.
Moral Panic
Catch-All header for the various forms of
moral panics relative to internet or digital
technology.
Changing Face of Contemporary Terrorism
References that focus on the shifting ways
that contemporary terrorist groups operate.
Foreign Espionage or Sabotage
References to testimony relative to national
security when it concerns new threats of
foreign governments (i.e., Russia)
Internet Futures-Lagging Legislative
References to testimony that indicate a gap in
Response
legislative responses to growing digital
threats.
Lawlessness of the Internet
References that consider testimony that
frames the internet as being a place that holds
no formal regulation, in need of intervention
etc.
Disproportionate Legislative Responses
References that focus on the potential for
impacts that go far beyond the scope of what
the legislation targets.
Review Agencies
Intelligence Commissioner
Focused on components of the bill referring to
the Intelligence Commissioner.
NSIRA Review
Focused on components of the bill referring to
the National Security Intelligence Review
Association.
Figure 3.1: Initial codebook with descriptions
To properly facilitate the evaluation, identification, and revising of proper thematic categories,
the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) Qualitative Studies Checklist was utilized for
each individual academic source when determining whether these codes were sufficient for this
thesis (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme, 2018). Given the nebulous nature of cyber elements
especially as it relates to national security, this was done to ensure that the codes generated were
reflective of scholarly, law enforcement, and political perspectives towards the digital powers
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being granted in C-59. The CASP Qualitative Checklist functions as an appraisal tool for
qualitative sources by examining 3 broad issues including whether the results of the study were
valid, what the results were, and if the results are assistive in a local setting. While the use of a
scoring system is discouraged, the checklist helps users to filter out irrelevant sources whose
results are unrelated to the research in question by drawing out the qualitative significance in
others. 10 questions of each source representative of the 3 broad issues help the researcher to
synthesize the results of each potential source and compare or contrast them to other sources. A
total of 20 unique identifiers were subsequently used to properly represent attributes found in the
testimonial accounts and briefs by expert witnesses and members of the committee. These codes
were then clustered into similar, overarching themes contained throughout the datasets to better
illustrate the forthcoming analysis. The initial project contained 7 clusters that included the
identifiers focusing on themes of general descriptors of the internet, digitalized individual
privacy concerns, and the advent of potential cyberwarfare from a digitalized cold war (see
Figure 3.1). During this initial coding, NVIVO’s case function was utilized to capture testimonial
data and attached to unique identifiers to represent each expert witness or committee member to
maintain data integrity. NVIVO’s case classification function allows researchers to generate
identifiers that can properly classify qualitative information as belonging to a select individual, in
this case, case classifiers were generated for each expert witness and committee member
involved in C-59’s deliberations (See Figure 3.2). Furthermore, each case classification was
assigned an occupation modifier to help differentiate industry alignment between expert
witnesses for potential further analysis. An example of this function was to differentiate expert
witnesses from the academia field or certain branches of government including national security
or the criminal justice system.
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Figure 3.2: Example of NVIVO’s Cases Function
Following this initial coding procedure, a secondary ‘focusing of codes’ was conducted
similar to Saldana’s (2014) methodology with the objective of combining similar or lesser used
codes together to prevent the study from spreading analytical implications too thin and to
strengthen the forthcoming analysis of codes that were comparatively stronger or provided more
value to discussions focusing on theory testing. This resulted in the condensing of the 7 clusters
initially identified into 5 more concise themes as well as the combining of the initial 20 codes
into 11 to facilitate a more meaningful analysis. Furthermore, during both coding procedures of
this study these datasets we’re also subject to brief analytic memos that contained personal
insights towards potential theme relationships, frequencies of similar topics contained in witness
and committee member dialogue, and early draft ideas concerning the resulting implications
towards Microdeviation Theory and technosocial scholarship. An example of these forms of
analytical insights can be viewed below, where an examination on the December 7, 2017,
meeting focusing on the definitions of “datasets” and their need to be broadly defined to keep
pace with technological advancement was briefly analyzed as both a potential for
disproportionate legislative responses and the normalization of expansive metadata surveillance
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(Figure 3.3). The finalized project contained a total of 13 committee meetings comprised of 26
hearings, 53 expert witnesses examined by 19 committee members (10 Liberal, 8 Conservative, 1
New Democratic Party) for a total of 495 pages (318 pages of committee meetings and 168 pages
of briefs).

Figure 3.3: Memo analysis example taken from the December 7 2017 meeting
iii. Analysis
The analysis of this research seeks to implement strategies similar to preceding academic
work that examined both C-59’s early stages as well as legislation prior including C-51. For the
purpose of discussing national security legislation in a Canadian context, this research was
particularly interested with how these new mandates that are motivated by the modernizing of
Canada’s national security legislation can indirectly expose drastic implications on international
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relations. As mentioned previously, publications from The Citizen Lab (2017) and West (2018)
both demonstrated that qualitative studies can indeed bring into focus the seemingly out of reach
yet very plausible ramifications that cyber-empowerment of national security agencies can have
on future theatres of war, especially with regards to how Canada positions itself alongside United
Nations members.
Alongside the 2 waves of coding, iterative memos were frequently drafted that focused
on bringing out the more abstract sources of qualitative data for this projects analysis. For clarity,
this meant making memos concerning an array of topics that focus not only on how certain
testimonial accounts from expert witnesses frame the objectives of C-59 with concerns to
international relations or Canadian Charter rights, but also included notes referring to the
exchanges made from committee members. This included (but not limited to) frequent reflection
on the tone of how certain questions were asked, the negotiations and balancing of Charter rights
as they referred to the context of national security, or how the new mandates contained in C-59
could be justified in contemporary society. Saldana (2014) notes that these forms of analytic
memo writing help to bolster both creative thinking of the project’s objectives, but also inform a
projects analysis by allowing the user to begin generating ideas early on in the research process
and facilitate the revisiting/revision of codes in order to bring about more substantiated
arguments.
Given the nature of this research, it was vitally important to establish a codebook at the
onset of qualitative data analysis. Rather than letting the data generate themes/codes similar to
grounded theory, 3 initial themes reflective of the 3 main objectives to Microdeviation Theory
(normalization, manufactured uncertainty, disproportionate legislation) were developed and
added to the codebook at the onset of QDA while letting other themes emerge inductively. As
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such, while certain codes identified in this study were given flexibility to be revised if needed it
was important from the onset that the codes used objectives outlined by Popham (2018) in
Microdeviation Theory and that they be given priority when examining the datasets.
Furthermore, given the 3-stage trajectory that Microdeviation Theory establishes to warrant its
utility this meant that evidence throughout the datasets had to sufficiently contain testimonials
for each of the 3 aspects. Whereas those themes were solidified prior to conducting QDA, other
themes that were established reflecting key properties of the bill (including CSE cyberoperations
and unifying Canada’s national security review mechanisms) were given partial latitude to be
modified in future reflections. Given C-59’s sweeping nature in fundamentally changing
Canada’s national security agency structure, themes focusing on the Cyberoperation mandates of
the newly enacted CSE act as well as the salient testimonials concerning the overhaul of both
SIRC and the CSE Commissioners office into the NSRIA were also given priority in qualitative
data analysis as the forthcoming discussions on these themes will show.
iv. Results
The results of this methodology helped to establish a sophisticated NVIVO document that
itself contains a dataset with the multitude of themes that were persistent throughout the
legislative process leading to C-59’s formal ratification in June 2019. Furthermore, this dataset
also contains a case management suite that includes indicators regarding the occupational and
political affiliation of expert witnesses and committee members respectively. This includes
identifiers regarding expert witness qualifications as well as information that briefly highlights
the industries and employers each witness represents. Additionally, this also included attaching
testimonial evidence to their specific expert witness that assists in categorizing and potentially
informing qualitative analysis that can focus on their significance to the overall debates
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regarding C-59’s contents. 51 expert witnesses were identified from 5 different industries across
Canada representative of 24 different employers ranging from national security agencies
(CSE/CSIS), civil rights groups, as well as individuals appearing either on their own or
representing academic universities in Canada. Finally, 20 members of parliament that established
the committee were also identified with political affiliation from the Liberal Party of Canada (10
members), Conservative Party of Canada (8 members), and the New Democratic Party (1
member).
v. Limitations
Given this thesis’ stated research objectives, the primary limitation to this work concerns
a pre-established negligence to the inclusion of other facets of C-59 that include meetings
focusing on other aspects such as the reconciliation of C-51’s expansion of the No-Fly List and
secret courts or the revision of the previous advocating-terrorism offence. This meant that while
this thesis’ results will have bias on concerns relative to cybersecurity and expansion of digital
powers, that a broader discussion surrounding other aspects of the bill are precluded here from
analysis. Furthermore, the utilization of QDA also precludes this study from formally exploring a
quantitative approach to examining possible correlations amongst the varying degrees of
testimony contained and determining if any measurable impact exists towards C-59’s finalized
structure. Additionally, focusing this study specifically to the meetings surrounding C-59 results
in the exclusion of other government meetings and publications surrounding C-59 that took place
during the same time that may have focused on specific aspects of legislation including the
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.
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FINDINGS
i. Introduction
In total, the dataset contains thirteen primary meeting minutes that were identified as
having sufficient testimony relative to this thesis while also including ten secondary witness
briefs for a total of twenty-three qualitative datapoints for analysis. The page total of the primary
datapoints contained 318 pages, while the secondary datapoints comprised of 177 pages for a
complete sum of 495 pages of data. From these twenty-three datapoints, the entirety of codes
identified throughout this research contains a total of 520 references pertinent to the different
themes that were present and can be viewed in the Appendix A.
While the following sub-sections will examine each component’s findings in greater
detail, this section will provide a general overview concerning how Microdeviation Theory was
tested and what evidence contained in the dataset supports the possibility of microdeviation
presence. To test the integration of Microdeviation Theory in relation to C-59’s deliberations, the
committee deliberations were deductively assessed for thematic evidence in alignment with
microdeviation including normalization, moral panics, and disproportionate legislative response.
The thematic approach also allowed for exploratory analysis of additional themes outside of
Microdeviation Theory as supplemental towards this projects analysis. This included the
identifying of four key themes that included considerable focus on C-59’s relation to Canadian’s
expectation of privacy rights online, the examinations that focused on the newly implemented
NSIRA and their capabilities to monitor 3 NSAs, as well as the bigger theme surrounding
concerns relative to the new powers being granted by C-59, the most notable surrounding the
new active/defensive cyberoperations powers being added to the CSE’s mandate. The following
pages will further provide commentary on the most salient of findings that emerged from these
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meetings while also providing supplemental excerpts of specific exchanges and examples of
testimony made to further bolster the fourth-coming analysis.
ii. Findings V1.1: Microdeviation in C-59
At the onset of data analysis, three initial themes were defined, reflective of the three core
components of Microdeviation Theory as outlined by Popham (2018). First, a theme was
identified to reflect occurrences of testimony where cases of normalization in seemingly banal
but deviant forms of digital conduct were present. A second theme was then generated to capture
data that encapsulated potential displays or attempts at inducing moral panic regarding
digitalized deviances or as Popham (2018) refers to as “internet futures”. And lastly, a third
theme was generated to reflect testimonial experts that primarily focused on the seemingly
disproportionate measures contained in C-59. Each of these components are prescribed in
Microdeviation Theory.
Referring to Popham’s (2018) explanations of normalization, he argues that the deviant
elements of the internet and technology that are relatively commonplace for a typical user
include seemingly banal or generally accepted facets of deviant online behaviours including the
presence of unwarranted solicitation via email (spam/phishing) or the utilization of “fake news”
or “troll bots” that seeks to “obfuscate historical accounts of events or ideas through
manipulation of records” (p. 161). For the purposes of this study, the definition was applied here
without much alteration while also seeking to expand on the elements discussed in
microdeviations regarding the topic of acceptance among a populace regarding digital data
collection and astroturfing online. In other words, part one is that every day online behaviours,
which we typically wouldn’t tolerate during in-person interactions, have become so common that
people tend to overlook them. This is where the language about “defining deviancy down”
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comes from. This meant that in order to be properly codified as a form of normalization,
narratives or testimonial accounts needed to discuss perspectives relative to the idea of topics
such as mass surveillance, social media disinformation, and the supposition that the public holds
attitudes that are dismissive of or accept digital nuisances.
At this time, it’s important to note here the more general observations regarding
narratives reflective of this theme. Of the twenty-two references found in the dataset that were
codified as a form of normalization, it was found that the main area of concern regarding
normalization focused on two core aspects. First, a sense of naivety amongst Canadians about
data collection policies online, and second, the broader cultural impact that astroturfing has
towards national security objectives. This included discussions both from the committee
members as well as from expert witnesses surrounding the growing integration of social media
platforms and smart technology devices into Canadian’s social lives, and the perceived lack of
understanding towards those platforms terms and conditions documents that dictate what forms
of data can be collected and stored for future use.
The second deductive theme assessed the meetings testimony by expert witnesses for
evidence of moral panics, aligning with Popham’s (2018) arguments about manufactured
uncertainty and digitalized insecurity pertaining to technological developments outpacing
legislative reach. While this theme typically focused only on narratives that utilized evocative
language meant to garner anxiety or fear regarding a supposed lawlessness of the internet, what
was of peculiar interest in this study is how these narratives were noted to branch into three
predominant sub-themes: the digital advancements being made in terrorist groups both foreign
and domestic, certain sub-elements of the types of sabotage or espionage conducted by foreign
states, and most notably the idea of Canada’s national security legislation regressing in response
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to “internet futures”. Of the 148 instances where language indicative of moral panics occurred,
78 references were noted to have utilized fears of a lagging legislative response to contemporary
technological development to advance some of the more controversial aspects of C-59 including
cyberoperations.
Lastly, the concluding theme of microdeviation are the resulting legislative responses that
can be regarded as having disproportionate implications outside of envisioned parameters.
Popham (2018) notes that this typically occurs following the presentation of moral panics
towards unknown facets of internet subcultures or the proliferation of technological development
that can elicit calls for immediate sanction or regulation. This means that the legislative
responses being introduced carry with it the possibility of granting legislative empowerment that
far exceeds their discernable harm. This can include Nova Scotia’s Cyber Safety Act as an
example, while more recent domestic and global legislation like the 2011 Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA), or 2019 Article 13 of the European Union Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market might also be considered. While the purpose of this thesis is not to undermine the
legislative responses needed with an ever-evolving digitalized threat environment, it’s necessary
to highlight the concerns brought into testimony over C-59’s overhauls and digital empowerment
of Canada’s national security agencies. Initial feedback on C-59's earlier drafts by Parson's et al
(2017) and West (2018) provide scholarly examples of this theme when considering the
international implications that can occur relative to the expansion of CSE's mandates to include
active and defensive cyberoperations. Most notably, these studies highlighted how the lack of
codifying cyberoperations in legislation can carry with it the potential to be considered as acts of
war against pre-existing United Nations treaties pertaining to self-defence. As such, this study
considered instances throughout C-59’s deliberations that focused on the perceived impacts
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towards both Canadian Charter rights as well as the possibility of international retaliation
towards operations carried out by both civilian and military agencies.
Theme One: Normalization of Digital Deviance
As mentioned above, Popham’s (2018) Microdeviation Theory considers normalizations
in digital spaces to include relatively banal but also deviant facets of the internet that are
subjected to a general acceptance and relegated to aspects consistent with typical internet usage.
This pattern of normalization further drives its acceptance among internet users who can become
apathetic to attempts at legislating digital deviant behaviours. Alongside the relatively harmful
yet avoidable nature of something such as unsolicited emails, Popham (2018) also notes that
efforts to manipulate narratives online such as through technological revision/astroturfing
(MacLean 2008) have also been subject to further normalization and acceptance.
Given this definition, the meetings considering C-59’s mandates as well as supplemental
briefs given by expert witnesses were examined for instances of testimonial or cross-examination
evidence that contained narratives or structures consistent with an element of normalization or
inattention by Canadians despite the deviant element of possible harm. Ideally, evidence would
be considered a form of normalization when narratives such as “taking common technological
advancements for granted” or “Canadians lack the appreciation or knowledge of how certain
parts of the internet function” were present. This resulted in the capturing of 22 instances
whereby these forms of normalization had occurred.
Regarding the normalization of digital deviancies online, one such aspect considers
testimony made by expert witnesses that allude towards a growing naivety of Canadians’
considerations of the threat that the cyber domain has against national security. This includes
both the appreciation of the potential of harm against Canada’s critical infrastructure as well as
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the legal avenues that are available to counteract them while also respecting the rule of law. An
example of this includes expert witness Lieutenant-General Michael Day’ opening remarks
(42nd Parliament, 2018):
With regard to electronic surveillance and security, I admit to an incredulity at either the
inability or naïveté of Canadians in general, and quite frankly, the government in
particular, accepting that there must be rules and policies surrounding these activities. It
has shocked me. Over the last four or five years, I’ve worked a lot in the cyber domain.
It's shocking to me how little effect successive governments have had in addressing the
cyber-threats that this country faces on a daily basis. The vulnerability of our energy grid,
the financial sector, among others, and the lack of a governmentwide set of policies and
legislation to enforce compliance leads me to believe that we are living in a country that
is now fully compromised by foreign actors at the state and non-state level. (p. 2)
Whilst Mr. Day’s comments here outline a digital threat landscape that has eluded appreciation
by Canadians, in the same remarks he also detracts from the predominant narrative of other
expert witnesses when examining the new mandates being granted to Canada’s NSA’s and
concerns of disproportionate empowerment (West, 2018; Nesbitt & West, 2019). His remarks
further denote the existence of a normalization by Canadians when it comes to appreciating the
surveillance threats the cyber domain has and how previous government responses to addressing
these vulnerabilities is lacking. In seemingly direct opposition to Forcese and Roach’s (2015)
prior analysis of metadata collection and bulk surveillance of Bill C-51 and its eroding effect
towards privacy, Day asserts that (42nd Parliament, 2018):
The CSE legal mandate is a good and useful step, but it’s only part of the picture. I am a
strong believer that mass surveillance metadata, not individual surveillance or collecting
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individual information, and the power of directed and non-directed machine learning are
critical to embrace and to better understand the space in which we are working. (p.2)
Again, we can observe here that Day’s testimony largely represents a shift in narrative of the
concerns raised by most scholarly research that preceded C-59’s deliberations that focused on the
expansion of and codifying of CSIS and CSE’s mandates to account for bulk surveillance via the
acquisition and analysis of both foreign and domestic databases (Nesbitt & West, 2019; Nesbitt,
2020; Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, & Deibert, 2017).
Further examples of normalizations were also present when examining the threats that
foreign governments, notably China and Russia, have on the Canadian populace via
disinformation campaigns through social media. Speaking on this concern, Honorable Harjit
Sajjan, then Minister of National Defence, explains (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2018):
My bigger concern, I’ll be honest with you, with nations like Russia, is how they can take
cyber and what we call hybrid warfare, such as with what’s happening in Ukraine, and try
to manipulate and influence populations. That is a concern and not just strictly from a
government perspective. We have to make sure we educate our citizens and our media.
(p. 9)
This comment referring to Russia’s relatively newfound use of social media for conducting
disinformation campaigns aligns with Buchanan’s (2020) discussion on the ‘organic reach’ that
these campaigns have when it comes to utilizing social media algorithms and exploiting
individuals who may be less competent in digital media literacy to detect disinformation in such
a way to disseminate disinformation on a national scale. These concerns of normalized
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unconventional methods in fifth-dimensional warfare were also echoed by Raymond Boisvert
during his testimony concerning the need of ‘modernizing’ CSE’s mandates through C-59 when
he also notes that enemy states “noted the ease and the immediate benefits of undermining our
democratic processes by undermining people’s trust in institutions, as well as our ability to
conduct respectful and constructive dialogue” (42nd Parliament, 2018, p. 11). These two
examples of testimonies made by expert witness’s help illustrate how the committee holds the
view that that Canadians have become normalized to disinformation online without resources to
help discern the credibility of their sources. Between mass media coverage, social media
exhaustion, and the surreptitious nature of how these attacks leverage commonly used networks,
Canadians have become accustomed to disinformation, but not immune to it.
Contained in both Hajjan and Boisvert’s testimony we can make 2 distinct findings
relative to normalization. First, these testimonial accounts reflect a growing concern of the
hijacking of traditional social media platforms to spread disinformation amongst a population
that has become a new method to conducting sabotage and influence offline violence (Bradshaw
& Howard, 2018). Furthermore, it can also be observed that a normalized trust of social media
platforms and IoT devices exists despite knowledge of how they create pathways to data
harvesting and exploitation. Secondly, Hajjan’s remarks to the need of properly educating
citizens and media reflect the potential of affirming initial research conducted by Arayankalam
and Krishnan (2021) that examined how social media disinformation online can adversely impact
citizens via Agenda-Building Theory. Finally, these findings help to support the occurrence of
microdeviations by providing qualitative evidence specifically towards how disinformation
campaigns online and the naivety of Canadians in understanding the complexities of
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vulnerabilities in the cyber domain as it relates to surveillance or data harvesting can be
reflective of normalizations made towards them.
Theme 2: Moral Panics
For the second component of Microdeviation Theory, moral panics informed by a
“manufactured uncertainty” towards digital technologies must be present as they inform the
perspectives that lawmakers may have towards perceived digital threats. Popham (2018) notes
that these anxieties regarding digital technology are effectively “products of modernization” that
are informed by “digital futures” (effectively the risks perceived of contemporary technology and
beyond that can be informed by depictions in fictional media) and become at risk of growing out
of legislative control or outpaced by the oftentimes slow legislative process (p. 163). This
generally occurs when such normalized deviancies progress past the point of containment either
through public outcry or corporate dictates. Furthermore, microdeviation theory proposes that
these moral panics may be seized upon by legislative bodies to depict the entirety of technology
or the internet as that of being a lawless entity in need of far-reaching oversights.
However, an unanticipated finding of this research concerns the branching of narratives
reflective of these moral panics into 3 distinct themes. Rather than narratives only focusing on
anxieties of contemporary technology, testimonial accounts were found to be representative of
fears concerning the digital advancement in terrorist or foreign states, foreign espionage tactics
augmented by technology, and generalized fears concerning a growing legislative divide between
what is captured in national security legislation and what technologies currently or theoretically
exist that can outpace it (hereby referred to as “Internet Futures”). Of these 3 sub-themes,
evidence of themes reflective to digital advancement in terrorist/foreign groups were captured 47
times, with testimony concerning foreign espionage capabilities occurring 26 times, and
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instances of internet futures occurring in 75 instances. Additionally, while the findings on these
sub-themes will demonstrate this, it’s important to note here that a common trait persistent in all
3 was that of a need to “modernize” Canada’s NSA capabilities to dealing with threats in a
digitalized threat environment.
The first sub theme, digital advancement in terrorist and foreign actors, emerged from
testimony focusing on the utilization of contemporary technologies. This included references to
how modern terrorist groups including Daesh have increasingly used traditional social media
channels to disseminate propaganda and recruit followers for radicalization. Drawing on sources
provided by both CSE (2019) and CSIS (2018) publications of threats facing Canada, this
included examining testimony on internet-based disruption campaigns, as well as the “fifthdimension” of warfare pertaining to global digital conflicts. These deliberations materialize when
examining testimony focusing on Canada’s national security against an expanding digitalized
threat environment. For example, Dr. Christian Leuprecht appearing on behalf of the Department
of Political Science of the Royal Military College of Canada remarks in his testimony that
(Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2017):
The fundamental conditions have changed. The security threats and vectors are much
broader and much deeper than they have ever been. If you think about hypersonic
manoeuvrable cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, cyberspace, violent
extremism, terrorism ideology, and also matters such as the globalization of organized
crime, these are all things that we can't just keep away from our borders. They affect us
here now, and they affect us every day. The security environment has fundamentally
changed. The premise that we're somehow safe because we're far away from the troubles
in the world simply no longer applies. (p. 10)
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Here, we can observe that Dr. Leuprecht’s testimony alludes to how contemporary technology
has drastically changed the threat landscape so much so that traditional borders to conducting
warfare can become obsolete as international groups weaponize the internet to conduct attacks
on Canada’s critical information structures. We can also observe here that the qualifications of
Dr. Leuprecht help to give considerable authority to his observations surrounding manufactured
uncertainty towards future threats by acting as a moral gatekeeper and use generalized
terminology that can further incite anxieties surrounding the internet and other forms of
technology.
Another finding surrounding the growing use of technology in national security cases
concerns the use of encryption protocols and their hindering effect on conducting investigations.
In the case of C-59, this includes cases whereby terrorist groups such as Daesh or domestic rightwing terrorist groups incorporate social media as an avenue to recruiting possible members for
further radicalization via encrypted channels such as the Dark Web or the use of sophisticated
encryption software to mask communications from being intercepted. The exchange between
committee member Pam Damoff and Deputy Chief Constable Laurence Rankin of the
Vancouver Police Department provides an illustrative example of how encryption can hinder the
progress of investigations (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2018):
Ms. Pam Damoff: I just want to start by thanking you both for your service and for being
here today with your testimony. It's much appreciated. I first want to start on the
encryption piece because when we were doing our study on the national security
framework, the chiefs of police were here talking about the need to have access to
encrypted data. Then when we subsequently went on the road with the committee across
Canada and had further witnesses, we heard overwhelming testimony that encryption isn't
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what we used to think about during the First World War or Second World War where it's
encrypted data and somebody breaks the code and everything's good. It's actually when
we give a back door to the good guys, like you folks, we actually are giving a back door
to the bad guys as well. I've had numerous conversations with people who work in that
field who said that's absolutely true. You're in a bit of a conundrum here, as you don't
want to make it easier for the bad guys to have access to data. I'm just wondering if you
want to comment on that and if there's anything in this legislation that would be able to
assist you without also assisting the bad guys from getting access to data. Either of you
would be fine.
D/Chief Laurence Rankin: I'll start. I don't know if there is an easy answer to that
question. I'd say that the barrier of encryption prevents us from obtaining a full picture of
the evidence that is in the possession of the individual the police are investigating. I've
talked to some of my tech crime people and they say you can have encryption technology
today that will eventually be defeated and there will be a workaround or, though research,
we'll be able to find a way, if you will a back-door way, to defeat the encryption. I think
that whatever we will come up with, the bad guys will find a way or discover it in the
same manner. I think what we find now is that police are simply not equipped to deal
with it as effectively, in some cases, as the bad guys. That's the position we find ourselves
in time and again. (p. 6)
The above exchange helps illustrate how contemporary and future technologies can provide a
premise for situating the tipping point of the need for legislative changes. M.P. Damoff aptly
notes that previous interpretations of what encompasses encryption is beyond what it used to be
with regards to military intelligence in both World Wars, and that facilitating back-end
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encryption access for law enforcement can also inadvertently provide motivated criminals the
same opportunity whether it be through that same back door or the creation of a new method.
Rankin’s testimony to that matter also contrasts with evidence of manufactured uncertainty as
the prevalence of new technologies or encryption methods on an almost daily basis can easily
disrupt or circumvent any attempt to combat encryption back doors being entrusted to law
enforcement when conducting investigations.
When considering themes of internet futures, Popham (2018) notes that these elements of
manufactured uncertainty must be present as they inform the perspective that current legislation
cannot effectively meet the perceived impacts that further technological developments have.
These anxieties can be driven not only by what contemporary technology is capable of but can
“create as many uncertainties as they dispel” (pg. 163). As such, when considering evidence of
internet futures, the concerns of modernizing or “future-proofing” C-59 was considerably
evident. Regarding CSE’s new mandates contained in C-59, Hon. Harjit Sajjan states that
“However, what is needed now are modernized authorities to ensure that CSE is able to continue
to adapt in this ever-changing environment both today and into the next 70 years.” Regarding the
new powers being granted to CSE to assist the Canadian Forces via cyberoperations, Sajjan
further states that (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2018):
Third, and of particular interest to National Defence, the technical and operationalassistance aspect of CSE's mandate would clarify that CSE is allowed to provide
assistance to the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. This
will enable CSE to better support Canada's military missions and the brave women and
men of the Canadian Armed Forces serving in theatre. Of course, CSE already provides
important intelligence to the forces under the foreign intelligence aspects of CSE's
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mandate. This legislation would allow CSE to do more to help them to, among other
things, conduct active cyber-operations in support of government-authorized military
missions. Bill C-59 will enable CSE and the Canadian Armed Forces to better co-operate
to ensure the best use of tools and capabilities to meet mission objectives. (p. 1)
Pairing this testimony with Hon. Harjjan’s previous comments towards modernizing Canada’s
NSA mandates, 2 specific findings towards both information sharing amongst agencies and
modernization tropes can be examined. First, while Maras’ (2017) research examining
intelligence sharing amongst agencies considered U.S. counterparts, the underlying premise to
Hajjan’s testimony here appear to indicate that a similar proposition is being made that the
integration of CSE’s cyberoperations will do more to bolster CAF military operations. Second,
the initial remarks towards the further modernization of Canada’s national security strategies to
account for decades of technological change also support microdeviation theory by providing
possible narratives towards manufactured uncertainty. The reframing of CSE’s mandate
proposed by C-59 towards facilitating a more active role in military operations harkens back to
West’s (2018) initial remarks on considering the potential consequences that cyberoperations
have towards foreign sovereign states that will inevitably be breached.
Finally, discussions around the capabilities of foreign entities conducting cyber espionage
or sabotage were a prevalent theme when considering narratives structured around moral panics.
Important to note here is that while this third theme may seem semantically similar to digital
advancement in terrorist groups, a key difference notes that these excerpts solely focused on the
manufactured uncertainties towards the capabilities of foreign state actors specifically. Preceding
Hon. Sajjan’s comments surrounding Russian capabilities to conducting hybrid warfare that was
demonstrated as a normalization example, he further integrates C-59’s perspective of
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cybersecurity in the overall threat environment (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2018):
In the overall context, we have to look at current threats, threats that are potentially
emerging, and what we can predict as future threats. This is the responsibility of the
government, to make sure that we have the right resources to be able to deal with threats
today and tomorrow. We've been dealing with non-state actors for some time, as well as
with state actors. Cyber is a significant concern, but I also want to say that, because we
have done extremely well in Canada, CSE has the ability, the expertise, to give
Canadians the assurance of tremendous safety when it comes to cyber. However, as you
know, with technology, we need to stay at the cutting edge. (p. 9)
Taken into the context of the modernization push that preceded C-59’s introduction, Hon.
Sajjan’s testimony here highlights the threats that foreign actors have regarding their expansive
capabilities to conduct acts of aggression against Canada when leveraging IoT technology and
the internet. However, it also becomes apparent here just how pervasive the terms “cutting edge”
and “modernize” are integrated through this testimony to portray possible threats that currently
cannot be comprehended or mitigated.
Theme 3: Disproportionate Legislative Responses
Following the occurrence of the previous two premises to Microdeviations, the third
element of the theory calls for critical consideration of the resulting legislative responses that are
formulated to control or mitigate harms from technology. Considering the human elements
behind the technology being used, Popham (2018) notes that the prevailing narrative amongst
legislators is that they must also be vulnerable to human intervention. Revisiting the example
regarding the DMCA, which sought to control supposed rampant piracy of media online, many
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scholars have long argued that the act was the product of oversight in legislative responses that
gave disproportionate powers to media companies that own the property in controlling media-use
online that fails to address the underlying causes to piracy online (Patry, 2009). As such, this
premise was utilized when considering examples of C-59’s mandates that may provide evidence
to whether C-59 was playing upon perceived risks of internet futures or normalizations of
deviant elements of the internet and technology with its drafting of powers towards Canada’s
national security.
To begin, the findings on this matter of microdeviation are best supported by the
following exchange regarding C-59’s overtly vague definition of electronic datasets and what
this means towards Canada’s NSA operations (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2017):
Ms. Julie Dabrusin: Thank you. Professor Forcese, when you were talking about datasets,
I had a couple of questions. First of all, do you find that the definition for “dataset” in
part 4 is sufficient?
Prof. Craig Forcese: Datasets are not robustly defined, so the definition of “dataset” is
fairly open-ended. It’s an electronic record characterized by a common subject manner,
without further resolution as to what that means. Left with a vague definition, I turn
instantly to what checks would exist to rein in an egregious, overbroad understanding of
what a dataset might be, as compared, say, to the Security of Canada Information Sharing
Act, where I agree with what was said before: that concept is overbroad as well. (p. 15)
This statement is demonstrative of concerns that portions of C-59 extended beyond practicable
definitions and instead offered wide conceptual definitions. As Forcese explains above, these
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oversights on providing definitions to datasets in such a way carries the possibility of being
subject to wider interpretations and possible exploitation. At issue here is whether the threat of
having innocent Canadians broadly defined publicly available data subjected to C-59’s
information sharing protocols and exploitation warrants the inclusion of a broad definition.
Similar concerns relative to the inclusion of Canadian metadata in Canada’s NSA mandates in
Bill C-51 were also raised by Forcese and Roach (2015) when considering how even anonymous
datapoints including call locations, cellular tower proximity, and dialogue length could still
provide intimately identifying data about an individual alongside “big data” which includes the
amalgamation and exploitation of smaller datasets for the purposes of conducting intelligence
operations. Ms. Lex Gill, of the National Security Program Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
echoes these concerns relative to the broader legislative definitions given in C-59’s terminology.
She notes that while CSE’s mandates specifically bar the agency from conducting surveillance
on Canadians, that the publicly available data clause to CSE operations in C-59 “exacerbates this
privacy risk” via the creation of exceptions in the bill that facilitates “the collection of Canadian
data, including one which allows its acquisition, use, analysis, retention, and disclosure, so long
as it is publicly available” despite CSE assurance in C-59’s meetings that this would not be the
case (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2017, p. 13). Her comments
towards public data exceptions in C-59 argue that the accountability mechanisms, while a
welcome change to review mechanisms, are effectively being undermined by broad definitional
concepts and clauses.
On the opposite end of the public data debate, another important finding here considers
Craig Forcese’s cross examination on how to reign in the definition of publicly available datasets
and the difficulties it will entail given the subject matter and the need for Canada’s NSA’s to be
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able to conduct their mandates without restrictive terminology (Standing Committee on Public
Safety and National Security, 2017):
Absent a specific suggestion in this bill, I don't know that I would single anything out as
better embedded in regulation. Professor Wark and Professor Carvin this morning both
mentioned that the concept of dataset is broadly clothed. If we were to define it rigidly in
the act, then we may have a problem. However, we don't. We have an open-textured
definition of “dataset” that's then subject to scrutiny by independent oversight entities.
That's an example of flexibility. There's also the prospect of “exigent circumstances”,
which the bill recognizes in several instances. I don't see this as overly restrictive, and to
a certain extent, I think a lot of these changes surface internal guidelines that the services
have in fact employed. I think codifying it in legislation is actually important because it
creates a sense that these are agencies that do comply with the rule of law that people are
otherwise unaware of because these standards are opaque and buried in operational
policies. I think that's important in terms of credibility. (p. 19)
It's here that we can observe that as Canada’s NSAs require more latitude in accordance with
their mandates, that a significant obstacle will be determining what aspects of digital datasets can
be fully encapsulated via legislation and what other factors need to be given space to operate.
This exception also raises concerns whether the maneuverability given to Canada’s NSA’s can
be properly kept in check via both the NSIRA and the Intelligence Commissioner. During his
introductory remarks, Michael Day goes one step further with his own assertion that the
restrictive components to electronic surveillance and cybersecurity mandates will hinder
Canada’s NSA’s in combatting cyber-threats (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2018):
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It seems to me that much of the public debate on the bill in question, C-59, is about legal
mandates, compliance, oversight, and governance. I don't wish to imply that this isn't
needed, let alone value added, but rather suggest that the necessity of this conversation
should not be mistaken for sufficiency. By itself, the debate on those issues is
insufficient. In a rapidly changing world, an equal amount of discussion should be given
to the efficacy of the security and intelligence agencies and supporting departments, how
well they work together, how rapidly they are able to, not just respond in the moment, but
adjust to changing threats, etc. (p. 2)
Michael Day’s testimony not only here but on other facets of C-59’s national security strategy
dichotomizes prevailing narratives and evidence of other expert witnesses that sought to integrate
more concise restrictions to intelligence activities in the furtherance of each NSA’s mandates.
Tying this back towards Microdeviations, the remarks run counter towards any unanticipated
effects that C-59 can have by arguing that considerations need to be given towards the efficacy
of Canada’s own agencies against a rapidly changing threat environment. Furthermore, the
remarks here also go against initial analysis of C-59 as conducted by Parsons et al. (2017) and
Nesbitt and West (2019) that suggests codifying mass-surveillance as authorized intelligence
gathering can have drastic implications towards egregious and unmitigated forms of unselected
mass surveillance.
While a section examining findings on C-59’s addition of active and defensive
cyberoperations to CSE’s will occur in the second half of this chapter, it’s important to
demonstrate here the initial findings on cyberoperations specifically when examined in the
Microdeviation context. Most notably, the inclusion of cyberoperations to CSE’s mandate was
found to often be viewed as one of the more disproportionate factors of C-59 given its novelty in
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addressing cyberthreats internationally (Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, & Deibert, 2017; Nesbitt
& West, 2019; West, 2018). In her opening remarks, executive director of OpenMedia, Ms.
Laura Tribe, considers the addition of cyberoperations as being (Standing Committee on Public
Safety and National Security, 2018):
The new active and defensive cyber-operations powers proposed in Bill C-59 for CSE are
directly opposed to the wishes of the majority of Canadians. We asked for privacy, but
instead we got an out-of-control spy agency with even more extreme powers than before.
Security and privacy experts throughout Canada have expressed in great detail the issues
with the proposed bill and the changes that need to be made to protect the privacy and
security of Canadians. Experts have warned of the consequences of granting powers like
these, powers that will be all the more dangerous given the lack of adequate oversight
included in the bill. (p. 2)
Laura Tribe’s comments here help to illustrate the backdrop that the new active and defensive
cyberoperation mandates have when considering Microdeviation integration. These findings
further help explain the hesitancy to expanding the powers of Canada’s NSA’s, specifically CSE,
when it comes to being a more active in Canada’s national security strategies. Notably, her
comments further reflect existing research by West (2018) that considers the addition of the two
mandates as being the equivalent of mandating state-sponsored cyber-attacks.
Microdeviations Findings: Conclusion
Given the demonstration of initial findings above, it can be observed that the tenets of
Microdeviation Theory can aid in the examination of legislative responses to digital threats, as
were apparent in C-59’s initial drafting and deliberations on the expansion of NSA mandates.
Given that the primary objective of this thesis was to examine the narratives employed by
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committee members and expert witnesses alike for potential applications of the concept, it’s
important to note here that there was a significant amount of testimony contained in C-59’s
meetings that was representative of the 3 core elements needed to justify its inclusion. Of the 520
codified excerpts of testimony, 219 instances were captured that supported tenets of
Microdeviation.
General observations of the dataset seem to indicate that Canadian naivety to digital
privacy, disinformation, and the willingness to impart seemingly banal types of data online for
the public eye informed most of the discussion of normalization to the objective reality of the
digital era. As illustrated above, this included references to how Canadians increasingly use a
variety of different technological products and software that become sources of data harvesting
or are readily accessible to the public. To use some of these products, they increasingly require
the consent of the user to have access to certain forms of data (including location, contacts, and
other admin privileges) which is willingly given less they be barred from future usage. Further,
the meetings saw substantial debate surrounding the digital capabilities of foreign states and
individuals to leverage online social spaces and global interconnectedness in such a way to
conduct sabotage or web revision. At face value, these narratives seemingly harkened to a new
“digital cold war” and a need to develop a “futureproofed” national security legislation equipped
with new and novel powers to protect Canada’s national security interests both domestically and
abroad.
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FINDINGS V1.2
Findings V1.2: External Emergent Themes
Before concluding the initial findings, it’s important to also note the external themes that
became prevalent during this study to warrant their inclusion in the forthcoming analysis. While
this study initially approached data collection contingent on the 3 overarching themes to
Microdeviation Theory, Saldana’s (2014) QDA methodology also facilitated the generation of
new codes via inductive reasoning and constant review and revision of emergent themes
contained in the data that could supplement a projects analysis. While examining the evidence
contained in C-59’s legislative process, four themes outside of Microdeviation Theory were
identified that had qualitative significance to the implications of this projects analysis. This
includes references to themes of how C-59’s mandates can impact Canadian charter rights and
Canadians digital privacy online (146 references), descriptive terms used by the committee to
describe facets of the internet and cyberconflict (39 references), evaluations of C-59’s new NSA
review agency (NSIRA) (51 references), and most importantly, the discussions surrounding C59’s cyberoperations mandate for CSE and the possibility of entering a cyber cold war (65
references). This section of the findings chapter will aim to give a brief overview of these themes
alongside their Microdeviation counterpart.
Theme 1: Charter Rights & Digital Privacy
To begin, themes relevant to concerns of Charter protections to privacy of Canadians in a
digital age were amongst the most prevalent identified outside the 3 themes related to
Microdeviation. For the purpose of this study, examples of this theme considered evidence
discussing C-59’s role in a digital age and how certain mandates contained in the bill can be
related to reasonable expectations of privacy as interpreted by section 8 of the Canadian Charter.
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Furthermore, evidence of these themes was also captured when discussions surrounding matters
of Canadian metadata online as explained previously by Forcese & Roach (2015) were
concerned. The premise of metadata’s role in privacy debates against national security legislation
here is not entirely new. Both Forcese and Roach (2015) noted in their analysis of Canada’s
previous national security legislation C-51 that the utilization of metadata towards national
security mandates can pose dire implications to Canadians privacy interests despite having
certain exemptions, specifically with CSE’s then mandate to not conduct surveillance operations
at Canadians either at home or abroad. Congruent with the findings here in C-59 is the concern
that the “breadcrumb” nature of metadata online doesn’t go far enough to protect Canadian
interests of privacy as the elements that makeup metadata (namely approximate geographical
location to cell phone towers, call length, or other attributable data) can be triangulated alongside
other minor data-sources in what Forcese and Roach refer to as “big data.”
Over the course of gathering data, it was noted that these concerns to digital privacy in an
advanced age permeated discussions surrounding both themes of normalizations in digital
subcultures as well as themes highlighting potential disproportionate costs to C-59’s mandates;
most notably being the impact that mandating cyberoperations in CSE’s legislation can have
towards Canadians publicly available data contained in Part 3 subsection 24(1) in the bill.
Regarding the potential naivety of Canadians to their public profiles online, committee member
Mathew Dubé notes “the argument can be made that it's publicly available information and that's
too bad for people who maybe don't manage their social media very well”, and it’s the
interaction illustrated here between Charter rights and how social media platforms afford an
avenue to forgoing privacy interests becomes apparent (Standing Committee on Public Safety
and National Security, 2017, p. 5). This finding can also be supplemental when considering
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Microdeviation as it relates to disproportionate legislative responses as privacy becomes more of
a commodity that diminishes unless the user actively takes steps to protect their data online. The
exchange between committee member M.P. Julie Dabrusin and Honorable Jean-Pierra Plouffe,
previously the commissioner of the CSE which oversaw their activities prior to the introduction
of the NSIRA, further illustrates these concerns (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2018):
They suggest that there are no charter or privacy rights that would be affected by these
techniques that will be used outside of Canada. This is with regard to the CSE.
Unfortunately, I don't necessarily agree with that view, and neither does the Department
of Justice, which is the legal adviser to the government. I'm quoting from the justice
department's legal opinion, page 9 of a document entitled “Charter Statement - Bill C59”. It's short, but it explains my position. I quote: The provisions authorizing active
cyber operations would not by definition engage any Charter rights or freedoms.
However, specific activities authorized under this scheme could potentially engage rights
or freedoms. The considerations that support the consistency of this aspect of the mandate
with the Charter are very similar to those supporting the consistency of the defensive
cyber operations mandate. One difference is the distinct purpose of active cyber
operations, which would be to further the government’s compelling objectives in relation
to Canada’s international affairs, defence or security. (p. 3)
The above exchange helps to further illustrate how considerations need to be given when asking
what limitations, if any, need to be examined when granting powers such as cyberoperations
especially as it relates to Charter limitations. Although the wording of C-59 requires
authorization on certain active and defensive cyberoperations, Plouffe’s testimony helps to
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highlight how certain activities that are integrated post-authorization can likely trigger them but
will not require re-approval.
Forcese further expands on the complexity of only protecting Canadian data from foreign
intelligence operations during his meeting for C-59 when he notes that the authorization process
is only triggered when they circumvent acts of Parliament and do not have a trigger for the same
protections outside of this scenario. He further argues that some of the intelligence gathering
activities of Canada’s NSAs can trigger reasonable expectations of privacy while not violating an
act of Parliament. Regarding how metadata collection avoids this violation, he notes that the
solution would be to expand this trigger to include (Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, 2017):
The new system will only resolve the constitutional problem if it steers all collection
activities implicating constitutionally protected information into the new authorization
process. The problem is this. Bill C-59's present drafting only triggers this authorization
process where an act of Parliament would otherwise be contravened. This is a
constitutionally under-inclusive trigger. Some collection of information in which a
Canadian has a constitutional interest does not violate an act of Parliament, for example,
some sorts of metadata. (p. 1)
The finding here is notable primarily as it reflects Austin’s (2012) analysis of how the rule of
law, in the face of growing surveillance technology, has subtly narrowed the legal definition of
privacy to facilitate the expansion of state authority powers. The deliberate codifying of only
requiring authorization when an act of parliament is triggered further expands the scope of what
encapsulates surveillance whilst disregarding the possibility of individual stakes in privacy.
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Theme 2: Situating Canada’s responses in a global context
Throughout the process of data collection, it became apparent that various committee
members and expert witnesses would often engage in matters focusing on descriptors indicative
of modern internet subcultures, as well as putting fourth suggestions of the growing integration
of cyberconflict in contemporary battlefronts. Additionally, there was a growing narrative that
sought to compare the cybersecurity efforts of Canada’s own national security legislation
towards that of other foreign states typically included in the Five Eyes alliance. Effectively, this
theme was generated in order to capture these instances as they contained dialogue that provided
underlying perspectives of committee members and expert witnesses alike as to how C-59 be
constructed to properly reflect contemporary technology and be of sound standing when
compared to other allies internationally.
These types of narratives were utilized to describe how foreign nation states both friendly
and antagonistic had rapidly cultivated their own states to be more proficient with the
development of new and novel methods of cyberwarfare technology and how Canada itself needs
to bolster their own defensive strategies with haste. A notable example of this concerns Mr.
Raymond Boisvert’s opening remarks during the January 30th meeting where he remarks that
“offensive cyber-tactics have been developed and are being applied by the best private security
firms in the world”, and notes that vital energy system attacks such as from cases involving
Ukraine and Germany warrant the need to empower CSE to carry out its mandates to protect
Canada from any potential attack on its own infrastructure (Standing Committee on Public
Safety and National Security, 2018, p. 11).
Additionally, Canada’s own national security mandates were often compared to those of
other allied states in the Five Eyes Agreement, as this partnership facilitates the exchange of
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intelligence amongst member states for the purpose of carrying out the protection of their own
borders against threats (Roach & Forcese, 2015). A notable inclusion of this concerns the
integration of CSE’s mandates to facilitate the agencies own resources alongside the Canadian
Armed Forces for the purpose of augmenting traditional military operations with the
supplemental authority of CSE intelligence. Speaking to the committee, Hon. Harjit Sajjan notes
that this integration “puts us in line also with our Five Eyes partners” and expresses that he was
surprised to see that CSE hadn’t been given this legislative power in other previous national
security legislation as it would allow the Canadian military the ability to leverage the agencies
technical expertise (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2018, p. 1).
Speaking in a previous meeting, Professor Stephanie Carvin is also supportive of the need to
integrate CSE into a more active cyber-role noting that in comparison to other Five Eyes allies
“many of whom have been quietly encouraging Canada to enhance its cyber-presence in the
wake of cyber-threats from North Korea, China, and Russia”. She further notes here that while
the legal and ethical challenges need to be appreciated, that by integrating these new powers on
statutory footing we demonstrate to our Five Eyes allies that while NSA operations become more
transparent (referring to NSIRA review), we also situate Canada as “a more reliable, dependable
partner” (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2017, p. 6).
Theme 3: Cyberoperations and the Cyber Cold War
As mentioned above, C-59 was often touted during testimony as a modernizing
legislation that aimed to bring Canada’s NSA’s and their respective mandates to a point where
their powers would effectively become “futureproof” for the foreseeable future. Prior to the
enactment of C-59 however, the CSE had not yet been formally established as a proper national
defence agency, rather, their mandates were contained in Canada’s National Defence Act (2001)
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and operated within the Department of Defence (Nesbitt & West, 2019). This all effectively
changed with C-59’s enactment as it formally established the agency as a separate entity
governed by the National Security Intelligence Review Agency and saw their mandates
expanded to better account for international threats and cybersecurity assurance. However, this
expansion saw the CSE’s 3 mandates expanded to 5, adding both active and defensive
cyberoperations to protect Canada’s information infrastructure and empower the agency to be
more proactive in countering threats abroad. Regarding CSE, these 2 mandates were amongst the
primary area of concern for the committee as the new powers were effectively new and hadn’t
been integrated before. Furthermore, external academic inquiry such as West’s (2018) analysis
on the potential implications towards international treaties posed questions to whether these new
powers could lead to inadvertent acts of war on other sovereign states. Additionally, initial
findings relevant to C-59’s new mandates also indicated a growing concern amongst committee
members and expert witnesses alike concerning the rapidly evolving “cyber-arms race”
harkening back to fears of a second Cold War, this time concerning the seemingly out of control
development of new and novel technology that could see warfare branching into the fifth
dimension.
Regarding cyberoperations, initial lines of questioning during C-59’s debates centred on
identifying and potentially getting ahead of concerns relevant to whether the utilization of
cyberoperations for Canada’s national security was disproportionate to the tangible benefits they
would provide. Speaking on how cyberoperations could protect critical infrastructure or prevent
possible cyberattacks, then Chief of CSE Greta Bossenmaier notes that (Standing Committee on
Public Safety and National Security, 2017):
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Some of the proposals in the legislation that's in front of this committee would allow us
to further use our cyber-capabilities to better protect Canadians' information. I mentioned
one already, in terms of being able to protect and deploy our systems on nongovernment
systems upon the request of a critical infrastructure owner, for example. The minister
referenced another one where we would be able to actually go out and try to prevent an
attack against Canada or Canadians or Canadian infrastructure before it happened. These
are two examples of how this act would help us better protect Canadians. (p. 17)
During the same meeting, Hon. Ralph Goodale further testifies that the measures being proposed
for Canada’s NSA’s prevent agencies from having to “sit back and wait to be attacked, even
though you know it’s going to happen”. Hon. Harjit S. Sajjan further echoes these remarks
noting that C-59 will empower CSE to become a more proactive agency in conducting their
foreign intelligence mandates as well as becoming more empowered to work within non-federal
critical infrastructure to secure Canadians from external cyberthreats. As mentioned before in
this study's findings surrounding disproportionate legislative responses however, this further
empowering of CSE to conduct such cyberoperations carries with it the potential for
considerable blowback on an international scale that should not be disregarded.
Testimonial accounts linked to discussions surrounding cyberoperations also carried with
it narratives that envision the evolving digital landscape as a new threat environment reminiscent
of the Cold War. The expansion of CSE’s mandate to include the capability to conduct
cyberoperations and the unknown nature of what they will include in practice was a cause for
great concern amongst expert witnesses. Given the extreme capabilities that cyber-attacks can
have in terms of inflicting serious impacts on most of Canada’s critical infrastructures, evidence
that focused on a coming “Cyber Cold War” was especially prevalent, as the exchange between
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committee member M.P. Peter Fragiskatos and Scott Newark, a former special security advisor
on counterterrorism, illustrates (Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security,
2018):
Mr. Peter Fragiskatos (London North Centre, Lib.): I take your point that in new threat
environments, Canada and other democracies need to really adapt. You're familiar, I
think, with the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo. They
recently published a piece, and I want to read a quote from it and get both your thoughts.
They say, as follows: ...if the Cold War taught us anything, it is that sometimes the best
way to ensure that everyone lives in peace is to ensure that everyone has the ability to
destroy one another, otherwise known as the doctrine of mutually assured destruction.
Cyberweapons that have clear offensive uses do just that. They show the world (or at
least those that know you have them) that should you be attacked, you can escalate and
retaliate in turn. Is this an apt way of looking at where we find ourselves today in terms
of international security?
Mr. Scott Newark: First of all, I think it's important to appreciate that the acronym for
mutually assured destruction is MAD, but part of the complexity in that is that the threats
are not necessarily from state actors. That's a challenge in itself. The thing that concerns
me the most, frankly, is advanced persistent threats. They're already planted and they're
sitting there waiting for the folks in Pyongyang or Beijing to decide that now is the time
we're going to do this. Having said that, however, I think it is critically important, given
the authority and the power that's there and its ramifications, that this should not simply
be one branch of government reporting to another, then signing off and saying that's it. I
think this is something, given its importance, that requires some form of independent
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review and authorization. Although we would want all of these circumstances to be
considered exigent, some kind of a review should be done after the fact. I think, just as a
general principle, that unless there's a reason not to have that independent oversight, the
nature of the authority is such that it requires that balancing effect. (p. 4)
The above exchange helps to illustrate how the spectre of a growing cyber arms race is framed
and presented as a call to arms in terms of increasingly expanding Canada’s offensive
capabilities in the cyber realm. As this study also found in terms of findings relating to previous
instances of manufactured uncertainty, the internet has increasingly become a new front in terms
of international conflicts that requires the passing of legislation such as C-59 to protect Canada’s
infrastructures pre-emptively rather than reactionary.
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DISCUSSION
i. Introduction
This thesis endeavored to provide a critical examination of the narratives and evidence
both committee members and expert witnesses utilized to advance certain policy positions or
legislative concerns to the powers being granted in C-59 towards Canada’s national security
agencies. I sought to explore committee dialogue – which ultimately shaped the nature of the
CSE act – through the microdeviation lens, focussing on participants’ use of narratives of
manufactured uncertainty towards technology and rapidly evolving digital threats to national
security to advance some of the more disproportionate or novel mandates based on the guise of
modernizing Canada’s national security strategies and legislation. Furthermore, I also sought to
provide a commentary on how C-59’s mandates could inform scholarly discussions in
Criminology surrounding technosocial elements as discussed by Brown’s (2006) Criminology of
Hybrids by examining narratives and evidence in C-59’s deliberations for perspectives relating to
how technology and the internet has further augmented the capabilities of foreign states and
individuals and the implications it has towards scholarly debates surrounding traditional
cybercrime literature. The final objective of this research sought to examine how the underlying
narratives to modernizing Canada’s national security agencies and legislation via empowerment
and expansion of their mandates towards a rapidly evolving digitalized society could withstand
Charter constraints or violations.
The implementation of microdeviations towards Canada’s national security policies
proposes a new perspective in scholarly circles when considering digital deviance and IoT
technology and how the two are increasingly becoming ingrained with one-another (Maras,
2015). The findings demonstrated in this thesis help advance key arguments made in Popham’s
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(2018) initial article while also expanding on Brown’s (2006) conceptualization of the
“criminology of hybrids” and how both the physical and digital elements of an individual are
increasingly becoming resistant to classical criminological theories of crime that examine the
two as separate entities. That is to say, the presence of microdeviations in C-59 carries
implications towards traditional criminology and policy development that proposes physical or
classical interventions to control cyber-criminal behaviour. Namely, the reality exists that
individuals no longer visualize technology as mere tools to conducting criminal acts, but rather
the proliferation of IoT technology and social media has enabled individuals to adapt them as
extensions of their own bodies. As such, legislative attempts that focus on the multitude of fronts
that the digital realm represents need to be able to appreciate how certain powers being granted
towards the perpetuation of a more active surveillance or disruption can disproportionately harm
innocent users especially in the context of withstanding human rights challenges. As Lyons
(2015) noted in the wake of the Snowden revelations, the expansion of surveillance from
individuals to mass surveillance can itself carry vast implications of potentially entangling
innocent users in its web. This is not to say that the objective of this research was to paint C-59’s
policy goals in a bleak perspective, rather, the incorporation of the theoretical perspectives
sought to provide a unique perspective in asking whether said policy objectives are appropriate
and based on existing evidence.
This research was carried out utilizing qualitative methodology, most notably Qualitative
Data Analysis via Saldaña (2014) as it allowed the constant revisiting and revising of the most
prominent themes contained within the dataset while also initially approaching the dataset with
pre-determined themes reflective of microdeviations. This meant that as research progressed,
certain themes could be generated, merged, or discarded depending on qualitative value to the
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overall research project and facilitated the generating of preliminary analytical memos indicative
of possible answers to the initial questions being asked. Initial results were promising as the
testimonial accounts and evidence presented in C-59’s deliberations aligned well with the
deductive themes of microdeviations while also generating additional themes via inductive
analysis that were supportive of the possibility of Microdeviation Theory’s utility in examining
Canada’s national security legislation. Furthermore, the additional themes that were generated
via QDA also provided additional points of analysis towards the implications that C-59 has
towards the global onset of rapidly developing and leveraging of technology and the internet to a
potential cyber cold war.
Discussion: Normalization of Digital Deviance
When examining the meetings for evidence of normalization, what became apparent at an
early stage of this research considers how testimonial accounts and cross-examinations by
committee members perceived global advancements in technology and the internet towards the
balance of preserving Canada’s national security. Notably, the prevalence of social media, smart
home technology, and a perceived naivety from Canadians towards terrorist capabilities both
foreign and domestic formulated what normalizations occurred in the context of what C-59
aimed to confront. Oftentimes it became apparent that some committee members and experts felt
Canadians would typically forgo privacy protection online by virtue of the technology utilized in
day-to-day happenings. For example, the prevalence of modern smart phones and other smart
technologies integrated via the IoT across Canada have situated internet technologies as a central
figure in most Canadians’ lives. This new reality is reflective of Maras’ (2015) arguments about
the expansive role IoT technology has in a user’s social life despite known risks. These forms of
technology often come with an underlying cost in the form of data aggregates that can be used to
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measure user habits or individual predictability which in turn affects how private users can
feasibly be free from surveillance (Maras, 2015). Furthermore, the growing market of IoT
technology can also open users to malicious cyber-attacks that can leverage exploits or
vulnerabilities which can easily spread to other connected devices nationwide. As was observed
in these committee meetings, Canadians have been situated as users that have normalized or may
not appreciate these costs by virtue of their continued usage despite the possibility of having
their data possibly swept up in surveillance nets or be subject to cyber-attacks.
As demonstrated by questions posed by committee members to expert witnesses, the
addition of the “publicly available data” clause to data available to Canada’s NSAs at face value
appears to be a boon to conducting investigations as users will continue to freely share their daily
lives online. The logical connection of this thesis’ findings concerns how similar narratives were
utilized by both committee members and expert witnesses alike to demonstrate how Canadians
have normalized these platforms that maintain public databases despite their potential to be
included in surveillance activities or subject to exploitation. Similar to Forcese and Roach’s
(2015) comments surrounding the controversial use of metadata against Section 8 privacy
interests, both metadata and the broad definitions given to publicly available data for C-59
indicate that the discussion will likely continue for the foreseeable future on whether they need
to be given reconsideration as technology users adapt devices ever more capable of collecting it.
Furthermore, the integration of Microdeviation Theory to C-59’s meetings demonstrates that as
technology and the internet continues to evolve and become more ingrained in user experiences
that the normalization of trading privacy interests will become further commodified as a buy-in
to its use; or as Maras (2015) notes, that the ability to retain anonymity will become increasingly
more difficult for the development of IoT technology to reach its full potential. This effectively
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makes the negotiation of maintaining anonymity online a zero-sum game: that to continue using
web-based services, you must forgo any personal stakes in maintaining anonymity and accept the
possibility of having personal data shared online be subject to active surveillance by extension of
the public data clause in C-59. In the wake of devices increasingly becoming connected to the
internet and requiring frequent consent to data collection, this hypothetical becomes increasingly
close to reality.
A final point regarding normalization that warrants revisiting here concerns the
susceptibility of Canadians to disinformation campaigns online as well as findings from C-59’s
meetings that advanced concerns relative to the ongoing leveraging of IoT technology and the
internet by foreign adversaries. (Arayankalam & Krishnan, 2021), the normalizations by
Canadians towards the capabilities of foreign states or terrorist groups was framed in such a way
that the potential impacts of deviance online were minimized or disregarded as being able to
occur in Canada. Of interest to this study concerns how these normalizations were utilized by
some expert witnesses and committee members as a vehicle towards some of the more
disproportionate elements of C-59. Despite this naivety towards threats online, C-59 was
oftentimes positioned as a needed response to better protect Canadians from threats that they
may or may not be able to fully appreciate despite concerns of disproportionate abuse raised by
other expert witnesses.
Overall, the framing of normalizations towards deviant elements of online subcultures
and the progression of technology raises concerns of how typical users in Canada overlook them
in their own daily usage. Despite their propensity of effectively being mass data aggregators of
personal data, Canadians are continuously conceding ground on what constitutes private,
personal data online. Whether by willful ignorance or lack of appreciation, the continued use of
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social media and software that increasingly requires new permissions to function means that
Canadians will increasingly commodify certain elements of their own personal lives to maintain
participation in digital communities despite vulnerabilities to exploitation. Furthermore, this was
also observed when we consider the increasingly expansive ecosystem of SMART technologies
that are being integrated into Canadian homes and businesses. These concerns were also echoed
in certain testimonies that considered the advances being made in contemporary technology and
national security when examining Canada’s vulnerabilities to cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure. As more devices are added to their networks, so too will the attack surface expand
resulting in additional avenues to cyberthreats.
Discussion: Moral Panics and Manufactured Uncertainty
Across many of the meetings that took place, what became increasingly prevalent early
on was how the need to “modernize” and “future proof” dominated most discussions surrounding
C-59’s refresh on national security objectives. For example, statements made by government
officials suggest that they perceive social media and IoT technology as a growing threat to
sovereignty, a domain that they see as having been leveraged by foreign state actors and
domestic groups. Testimonial accounts by expert witnesses reflective of changing and adapting
technology reflect anxieties about internet futures or manufactured uncertainty by employing
examples of foreign adversarial use of developing technology such as AI and botnets to
conducting acts of aggression through the internet.
Most notable in this study concerns the use of narratives and evidence to frame previous
legislative responses in Canada against these perceived threats in the cyber-domain as being
insufficient and unadaptable towards contemporary and future threat environments. Of the
committee members and expert witnesses who generally expressed support for C-59, the bill was
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often touted as one that enables Canada to maintain its global competitiveness against evolving
cyberthreats and codifying powers that would facilitate a stronger national security prerogative.
A central concern reflective of the moral panic process in these meetings focuses on the
apocryphal connection between online activities and vulnerabilities and major socio-political
epochs like the cold war. The advancement and integration of contemporary technologies and
internet subcultures including social media in these meetings were the main drivers used to
further advance concerns that Canada’s lagging legislative response was hindering the countries’
efforts in the escalating cyber-arms race that foreign nations and terrorist groups were already
involved in. These elements of fear were developed and used to advance concerns of normalized
ignorance by Canadians towards these expanding vulnerabilities.
It is on this emergence surrounding findings that were reflective narratives reminiscent of
cold war era fears that requires a great deal of consideration in terms of this studies implications.
While the capabilities of motivated threat actors either domestically or abroad cannot be
understated, oftentimes what this study found was those statements pertaining to how these
attacks could be carried out digitally were often supplemented with evidence pointing towards
the need to stockpile and expand powers that could be granted to Canada’s NSA’s. The use of
these rhetoric’s when advancing manufactured uncertainties was powerful in terms of providing
the justifications needed for their inclusion in C-59. These forms of narratives were especially
prevalent when considering testimony given by members of the then Liberal majority
government such as Hon. Ralph Goodale and Hon. Harjit Sajjan. Like Graebner’s (2000)
analysis on the use of rhetoric to justifying U.S.A.’s stockpiling of nuclear weaponry, instances
of these manufactured uncertainties towards the capabilities of fifth-dimension warfare
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permeated most of the discussions surrounding what forms of threats Canada faces in the near
future and how a perceived lagging legislative response warranted the inclusion of new powers.
Discussion: Disproportionate Legislative Responses
The final arm of microdeviation holds that states will respond to inflated situations by
developing disproportionate legal measures that do not adequately address contemporary digital
threat environments. Popham (2018) argues that “public concern over an existing microdeviation
can lie dormant until a catalyzing moment occurs at which point it is subjected to
disproportionate response” (p.165). He further states that “these responses often take the form of
overt methods of control as traditional authorities attempt to maintain their dominance over
social space” (p.165). Most notable in this project concerns how evidence of this theme was
reflective on both sides of discussion concerning the permissibility of these more extreme
responses focusing on the expanded capabilities towards public data collection, broader
codification of databases permitted in investigations, and most notably the addition of active and
defensive cyberoperations. Whereas on one side these meetings contained testimony arguing that
broad definitions and expanded powers were poorly defined or too exhaustive, the other side
contained testimony advocating that being too restrictive on certain elements dealing in the cyber
domain meant that C-59 would further hinder Canada’s national security response.
One such example of legislative overreach extends from discussion about the definitional
limits for datasets contrasted against the broad scope of open intelligence available through
public and quasi-public sources like social media. Despite C-59’s creation of both the National
Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and the Intelligence Commissioner (IC), expert
witness testimony explored in this thesis continue to elevate the notion that the definition being
given for publicly available data does not sufficiently consider Section 8 protections of the
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Charter against data holding reasonable expectations of privacy. Considering testimonial
accounts from witnesses such as Laura Tribe (OpenMedia) or Lex Gill (Canadian Civil Liberties
Association), the broad definitions to what encompasses publicly available data or what datasets
can be acquired and retained for exploitation create an environment whereby a conceptual gap
exists between what government agencies are afforded to collect against the general public
knowledge of how these mandates can affect them. The significance of this can best be explained
if we consider the role social media platforms have in relation to publicly available data. As
these platforms have continued to evolve and become more ingrained with the social lives of
their users, they are more likely to engage in contextual sensitive activities that further increase
sharing of information against their own privacy interests (Acquisti, Brandimarte, &
Loewenstein, 2015). Despite measures that can be taken to reduce an external online footprint
(such as limiting a profile to private), the data that users provide can still be available on the
open market such as when Facebook allows their data to be purchased commercially. This
research further correlates that notion towards certain excerpts of testimony that calls attention to
the supposed elementary knowledge that most Canadians have with regards to what data is
public when using IoT and social media despite safeguards that for example require CSIS to
eliminate any identifiable information and dispose of datasets past 90 days (unless an extension
to retain is authorized).
However, on the other side of this debate was concerns of how motivated threats who are
aware of contemporary or developing technology can better leverage these sources to conceal
their activities or utilize technology as a compounding factor for cyberattacks. As we saw from
testimonial accounts including Lieutenant-General Michael Day or Deputy Chief Laurence
Rankin, evolving technology that facilitates device encryption or the increasing use of the cyber-
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domain in fifth-dimension warfare in their words require that these broader legislative terms be
accepted as any restriction or expansion on authorization processes would jeopardize Canada’s
national security. These testimonies further advanced that the powers being granted in C-59 are
more reflective of contemporary society, and that a growing stake in privacy rights is in of itself
a required buy-in to participate in it.
If we consider both sides of this issue however, it becomes increasingly apparent how a
growing conceptual gap exists when we consider the definitional values being attributed to
privacy rights and national security in a digital era. With a rapidly evolving and ever adaptive
threat environment becoming increasingly reliant on the fifth-dimension, new and novel
methodologies to combatting criminality online will continue to be proposed and implemented
on a national scale. However, just as extreme these responses are going to be, so to is a critical
examination warranted on the adverse or potentially disproportionate impacts they can have on
both innocent populations but also with foreign states, even more so when we consider the
international implications something like cyberoperations can have when held against existing
agreements such as the Budapest Convention (Couzigou, 2014; Schmitt, 2017). Considering the
relatively newness of both IoT and social media, it’s drastic expansion and integration into more
aspects of everyday lives has provided a boon to companies and governments alike who are able
to increasingly gather benign forms of data by its users who may not be able to appreciate just
how much inference can be made when parsing them through analytical programs for both
commercial and government use.
Discussion: Critical Reflections on Cyber Cold War and the Digital Arms Race
Before discussing final remarks on the more general observations that this study has
sought to establish, it’s imperative that findings relative to the notions of a rapidly accelerating
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digitalized arms race be provided dialogue as it can effectively encapsulate microdeviation as an
applicable concept towards national security legislation. Throughout the course of this thesis’
data collection, it became increasingly apparent that not only was microdeviation viable, but its
relationship towards the growing fifth dimension of digitalized warfare and the testimony
provided by committee members and expert witnesses provided ample opportunity for
comparisons to be made reflective of the Cold War. What that means distinctively is that this
study found that testimonial accounts would often weaponize narratives or evidence of the
seemingly not so far off or observable capabilities that foreign nation states, particularly China
and Russia, have in carrying out attacks on Canada or other allied states for that matter, and that
these novel powers akin to cyberoperations and the expansion of digital-based powers including
the expansion of big data and dataset exploitation were needed to ensure that Canada is aptly
equipped to deal with attacks carried out digitally in the future.
In this context, it’s equally important to situate just how pivotal of a role that foreign
threats have when leveraging modern technosocial platforms to conduct subtle acts of sabotage
that can substantially threaten Canada’s national security. As previous scholarly research has
demonstrated of foreign cyberthreat capability (Buchanan, 2020; Forrester, Bacovcin,
Devereaux, & Bedoya, 2019; Bradshaw & Howard, 2018), this study expanded on theoretical
explanations towards examining the utilization of Canadian naivety in the ways that
cyberwarfare can be fought via not only discreet sabotage campaigns akin to Stuxnet, but also by
weaponizing traditional social media platforms through the use of disinformation campaigns.
Given this perspective, this study can provide an example on the rapid pervasiveness that
platforms such as social media have when challenging preconceived criminological works
examining the connections between individuals and digital technology in conducting deviant or
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criminal actions. The proliferation of digital platforms including social media and growing
concerns of foreign aggressors utilizing them to conduct sabotage campaigns internationally can
very well provide an opportunity to rethink the ways that people and technology interact
especially given the already prevailing scholarly works that situate how disinformation
campaigns through them can provide disproportionate benefits to foreign policy objectives for
very little cost.
As my analysis has demonstrated, the threat of foreign states use of these new campaigns
to conduct sabotage online and proliferation of advanced IoT technology has effectively heralded
a new call for preparatory measures akin to the nuclear arms race that sought a stockpiling of
weaponry to be deployed at a moments notice. These calls were observed across multiple
individuals who participated in the development of C-59 and notably included Hon. Harjit Sajjan
and Hon. Ralph Goodale, two key Liberal MP’s that were part of the majority government at the
time this bill was tabled. Additionally, this thesis also highlights how certain disproportionate
implications such as the impact this modernizing has against Canadian efforts towards
maintaining digital privacy online, and how the advancing development of IoT technology
further broadens what data can become implicated especially when considering the use of
publicly available data in CSIS/CSE intelligence operations. It was also shown that digital
privacy, as interpreted through past judicial decisions in Canada, has become more-so a
commodity to be leveraged depending on what intelligence agencies require to maintain as
testimonial accounts called “cutting-edge” technological capabilities. This is important when we
consider the context that this evidence was examined via microdeviations and the
disproportionate legislative responses that can occur when considering regulation of online
spaces. While this thesis found C-59 as having disproportionate consequences to maintaining
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anonymity online, testimonial accounts of C-59 continuously framed it as being one that must be
acceptable. Against the backdrop of the Cyber Cold War however, this study hopes to have
provided a look at how the need to rapidly modify and empower Canada’s NSAs based on
currently technological trends needs to be based on reasonable temperance and restraint.
Whilst Stuxnet opened the metaphoric pandoras box to weaponizing digital technology
and the internet, C-59 could effectively be seen as an extension of this logic via the expanding on
developing of new measures towards conducting cybersecurity domestically. That is not to say
that the threat capabilities of foreign aggressive states when factoring IoT development and
digital sabotage are overestimated, but rather, the integration of Microdeviation Theory into this
volatile equation warrants the need to possibly re-think the scale that legislative responses are
formed based on contemporary perceptions of technological weaponry and viable near-future
developments. Considering testimonial accounts made by most expert witnesses towards the
implications of the digital landscape in everyday use as we know it, the exploitation of banal
elements of social media platforms and IoT technology by foreign states has thrust Canadian
Charter rights as we know it onto centre stage, and whether or not we can effectively develop
policy, no less so than national security legislation, against technological prowess with
advancements made annually that could effectively nullify any recent bodies of legislation
seeking to control them. This is further exacerbated when trying to reconcile growing cyberthreats and the need for Canada to develop and stockpile technological prowess, against section 8
rights as noted previously by Austin (2012) and her commentary towards further trade-offs in
digital privacy as contemporary forms of crime surpass written powers that law-enforcement
agencies have to respond to it. Considering the advancements that C-59 made towards Canada’s
NSA review and oversight capabilities with the NSIRA whilst also formally establishing CSE’s
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mandates and providing legislative grounding towards CSIS’ intelligence operations, C-59 made
clear, positive strides towards embracing a more unified national security strategy. However, this
study has also expanded on West’s (2018) and Parsons et al. (2017) warnings of the
disproportionate implications that weaponizing NSA agencies in cyber-realms can have when
factoring in the different ways that cyber-oriented measures can trigger or breach international
treaties when compared to traditional, kinetic measures.
Discussion: Final Observations & Future Opportunities
Before concluding this research’ discussion, it is vital that the issues pertaining to the
inclusion of Brown’s (2006) perspective surrounding the criminology of hybrids be afforded
examination. Outside of the inclusion of Microdeviation Theory, the underlying theoretical
consequences of her analysis towards the unification of person and technology informed most of
the criminological implications discussed here. Effectively, Brown’s work surrounding
technosocial elements to criminal behaviour gives affordance to arguments made here that
discuss notions of caution or restraint when basing legislative responses towards digitalized
threats. As traditional measures proposed via legislation or control have a continued potential to
failure, her work helps to conceptualize the shortcomings that these measures based on dated
aspects have when factoring the simple notion that technological advancement, especially in
contemporary society, will continue to be out of legislative reach and challenge criminology’s
traditional role in examining deviancy in binaries. Brown (2006) notes of this dissolving of
binaries:
The increasing ubiquity and complexity of both material and virtual technologies in the
production of social order and control in fact suggest this possibility. Transformational
interfacing technologies (cybernetics, genetic engineering, digital visualization, satellite
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communications, convergent mobile communications, virtual environments) demand a
rethinking of our heavily policed criminological boundaries. We need to dissolve the
‘scientific’ theories and the ‘social’ theories in order to grasp where we are now; and that
is immutably in the technosocial. Above all, this is a world where the ‘objects’ and the
‘subjects’, the ‘social’ and ‘scientific’ of criminology’s purview are co-extensive and
symmetrically active. (p. 710)
The above excerpt helps to provide a clarification on the line of thinking that this research hopes
to address: given this study’s establishment of the narratives used in C-59’s deliberations, the
underlying unease of potential developments in the technological sphere, and the established
capabilities that foreign or domestic actors have in exploiting technology for the purpose of
warfare, it becomes no less so apparent that technological constraints or empowerment based on
legislation still tethered to the logic of binaries as Brown (2006) notes might continue to fall
short in addressing the reality that the prevalence of IoT technology and platforms such as social
media have drastically altered the ways the humans interface with technology to engage in
deviant or criminal action. Furthermore, the outstanding evidence contained in this study
addressing the proliferation of disinformation campaigns online and their threats to national
security serve as additional challenges to scholarly perceptions of cybercrime. Are the actors in
these networks leveraging the internet itself as a conduit to disinformation, or is it the leveraging
of intimacy and trust that users place in social media platforms in an international actant
network? The former here poses questions of the threat actors’ usage of the internet as an
extension of themselves to crime, whereas the latter asks of the relationship between the user and
the digital landscape as an extension of themselves, yet both revolving around the same concept:
the technosocial.
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Building off of the concepts mentioned previously, it’s important to also situate the
concerns that the criminology of hybrids poses when factoring the 5-year review clause of C-59
that is set to occur in 2024. Touted by Hon. Goodale during the initial hearing on C-59 as being a
safeguard against rapidly evolving technology, the clause on face value appears to be conflicting
with itself on principle alone when factoring both tenants of microdeviation’s caution against
developing legislation based on perceptions of technology rooted in possible fiction, and hybrid
criminology’s warning towards binary measures of crime and control. Considering the rapid
growth of IoT technology and the pervasiveness in social media platforms online, advancements
could feasibly be made before the inevitable review of measures contained in C-59 that will
effectively perpetuate the lagging legislative response by Canada’s previous national security
legislation except on shorter intervals. Social media and disinformation campaigns alone should
serve as a grim example of how foreign aggressors can weaponize the growing integration of the
platform’s engagement algorithms with very little barriers to entry but with substantial
consequences. The ability to sabotage public discourses on democratic matters and facilitate realworld acts of violence internationally through the simple act of convincing fringe groups through
divisive rhetoric far exceeded the perception of foreign state aggression initially during the cold
war. If anything, Brown’s (2006) remarks on hybrids can lend credence to the notion that social
media and internet platforms have far-exceeded the simple accessory to an individual social life
and has instead become a platform that serves as an extension of the physical person into the
digital world. However, important to note here is that conclusions cannot be made confidentially
at this time given that C-59 was only just enacted and that any further analysis derived from
these concepts is far outside the scope of this paper.
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis sought to provide a theoretical perspective via the integration
of Popham’s (2018) Microdeviation Theory that seeks to provide critical context in examining
digital capabilities of foreign and domestic aggressors based on the more relatively banal
facilities of internet deviancy and subcultures. Beginning at the introduction of C-59 into
parliament for consideration, the bills heavy utilization in narratives focusing on the rapidly
evolving digital capabilities of threat actors and the new ways that sabotage can be conducted via
online channels through either disinformation or weaponizing rapidly evolving IoT technology
was seemingly used as the baseline for promoting the modernization and equipping of Canada’s
NSAs to be “cutting edge” against digitalized threats and the advent of a possible cyber cold war.
Specifically, new measures such as the formal establishment of the Canadian Security
Establishment Act, which brought with it the expansion of their mandate via the addition of the
ability to perform active or defensive cyberoperations against cyberthreats, and the solidification
of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s foreign and domestic data collection/retention,
saw the majority of concern amongst expert witnesses invited to testify on the structure of the
bill (Nesbitt & West, 2019; Nesbitt, 2020; West, 2018). Some of these primary issues consider
the role that CSE will now embody as a potential accessory to acts of war via their expansion of
the assistance mandate to conducting cyberoperations when granted authority to the Canadian
Armed Forces, with West (2018) noting that these new and novel measures being granted to CSE
carry with it the potential implication to becoming war-combatants and subject to international
treaties governing state self-defence. Additionally, further concerns arise when considering the
expanded definition of “publicly available data” as it pertains to state intelligence operations
especially against the backdrop of a growing IoT economy that increasingly encroaches
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Canadian user data to function, subjecting previously intimate data to the possibility of being
sold on the public market.

Additionally, the findings of this thesis also have importance towards how the outwardly
portrayal of one’s social life online and ignorance of privacy will continue to affect cultural
opinions towards the balancing of Charter rights against increasingly aggressive national security
measures. Findings from this thesis help support and build on existing scholarly research
surrounding the advent of disinformation campaigns online by providing Microdeviation Theory
as a new perspective to examining relatively banal behaviours online such as the social
“hacking” on social media platforms to advance foreign disinformation and affect Canada’s
social cohesion. The propositions of Microdeviation Theory advance that foreign adversaries will
leverage IoT technology and social media online to perpetuate disinformation across borders in
the hopes of undermining Canadian’s belief in democratic institutions and naivety towards the
threats that can occur online and translate into offline violence. This research helped to provide
further exploration and application of the concept by examining the expert witness responses to
C-59’s expansion of CSIS and CSE’s mandates including the formalization of bulk data
collection or providing CSE with the legislative authority to become a more pro-active agency in
the fight against threats online. The most prominent example of potential responses came in the
form of expanding CSE’s mandate to include both active and defensive cyberoperations, a new
and untested design of conducting cybersecurity that saw expert witness testimony align with
previous scholarly work on C-59 that warns of potential implications towards legislating statesponsored surveillance and the chilling effects towards international relations (Nesbitt & West,
2019; West, 2018; Parsons, Gill, Israel, Robinson, & Deibert, 2017). Furthermore, this research
expands on West’s (2018) works examining the potential implications towards international
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treaties by situating Microdeviation Theory as a unique perspective that can provide a baseline
approach to rethinking cyber-focused legislation and challenging current preconceptions of the
relationship between physical bodies and the technosocial as cyber-focused national security
strategies become more commonplace and present far-reaching consequences via the implication
of CSE in acts of war. However, given that C-59 effectively modernized both CSIS and CSE’s
mandates that was previously rooted in decades old legislation, a more proper examination of
how publicly available data or data willingly posted or sold online should be defined could be
explored in the future given that a study of that undertaking is well beyond the scope of this
research.

This thesis additionally provides critical qualitative documentation highlighting how a
proliferation of new and novel ways to conducting terrorism online with the utilization of IoT
technology and the Internet with the justification of developing more aggressive measures
digitally to preserve Canada’s borders and is partially indicative of previous work conducted by
Arayankalam and Krishnan’s (2021) research establishing how governments may utilize the
threat of social media disinformation campaigns to acquire further control of domestic media
groups to contain its spread. Furthermore, it is noted here that these findings further align with
Wall’s (2008) remarks surrounding the controlling stake that science-fiction portrayals of
technology can have with swaying public opinion on matters concerning the fight against cyberthreats.
While qualitative evidence was found across testimony to support notions of the concept,
the obvious lack of further elaboration on specifics pertaining to what types of technology
supposedly being developed mean that this study’s full connection between the 2 concepts
(manufactured uncertainty and terrorist/foreign state technological capabilities) is effectively
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constrained, but reasonable given how national security strategies require secrecy and
discreteness to be effective. These limitations contrast to the findings of Bradshaw and Howard
(2018) who noted that the lack of data surrounding misinformation campaigns and the modalactors who perpetuate them effectively makes “painting a complete picture of these activities by
government actors” an extremely difficult task with these gaps in data (p.29). However, the
integration of Microdeviation Theory here has provided an additional perspective to examining
the complexities of manufactured uncertainty towards a multitude of aspects reflective of social
media technology and the growing use and development of IoT products and what narratives
democratic governments may use when discussing the possible adverse effects towards a
nation’s sovereignty.
Given this context, the integration of both Microdeviation and technosocial concepts
towards evidence given by expert witness testimony helps to expand on scholarly work before it
considering cybercrime, but also attributes itself as an integration into the growing publications
surrounding the effects that disinformation campaigns via social media carry against
traditionalist ways of conducting aggression or sabotage against the international community at
large (Arayankalam & Krishnan, 2021). Focusing on testimony considering digital advancement
and the growing IoT economy online, the application of Microdeviation Theory highlights the
notion that Canadian adaptation of the digitalized economy and social media is still one that is
faced with naivety and is therefore subject to subversion via unconventional exploitation and
normalized elements pertaining to the true extent of maintaining privacy online or being
equipped to properly combat disinformation online.
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APPENDIX
MEETING
DATE
November 30,
2017

December 5, 2017

December 7, 2017

December 12,
2017

January 30, 2018

February 1, 2018

February 6, 2018

February 8, 2018

WITNESSES

INDUSTRY

Ralph Goodale
Greta Bossenmaier
Dominic Rochon
David Vigneault
Vincent Rigby
Kevin Brosseau
Douglas Breithaupt
Alex Neve
Craig Forcese
Stephanie Carvin
Wesley Wark
Brenda McPhail
Cara Zwibel
Lex Gill
Daniel Therrien
Patricia Kosseim
Lara Ives
Christian Leuprecht
Hayley McNorton
Ishaan Gardee
Faisal Bhabha
Zamir Khan
Khalid Elgazzar
Shimon Fogel
Kent Roach
Jean-Pierre Plouffe
J. William Galbraith
Gerard Normand
Micheal Vonn
Raymond Boisvert
Peter Edelmann
Gillian Carter
Paul Martin
Laurence Rankin
Christina Szurlej
Denis Barrette
Dominique Peschard
Pierre Blais
Chantelle Bowers
Richard B. Fadden
Faisal Mirza
Michael Mostyn
David Matas
Timothy McSorley
Laura Tribe
Michael Nesbitt

Minister of Public Safety
Chief, CSE
Deputy Chief of Policy and Communications, CSE
Director, CSIS
Deputy Minister (Public Safety)
Deputy Commissioner (RCMP)
Department of Justice
Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada
Individual, Carleton University
Individual, University of Ottawa
Individual, University of Ottawa
Director, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Acting General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Advocate, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Privacy Commissioner of Canada
Senior General Counsel, Office of the Privacy Commissioner
Acting Director General, Office of the Privacy Commissioner
Individual, Royal Military College of Canada
Research Assistant, Royal Military College of Canada
Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims
Legal Advisor, National Council of Canadian Muslims
Parent, No Fly List Kids
Lawyer, No Fly List Kids
CEO, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs
Individual, University of Toronto
Commissioner, CSE Commissioner
Executive Director, CSE Commissioner
Legal Advisor, CSE Commissioner
Policy Director, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Deputy Minister, Ontario Ministry of Community Safety
Member at Large, Canadian Bar Association
Staff Lawyer, Canadian Bar Association
Chief, Durham Regional Police Services
Deputy Chief Constable, Vancouver Police Department
Individual, St. Thomas University
Spokesperson, Lique des droits et libertés
Spokesperson, Lique des droits et libertés
Chair, Special Intelligence Review Committee
Acting Executive Director, Special Intelligence Review Committee
Individual
Chair, Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association
CEO, B’nai Brith Canada
Senior Legal Counsel, B’nai Brith Canada
National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
Executive Director, OpenMedia
Individual, University of Calgary
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February 13, 2018

February 15, 2018

March 22, 2018

April 17, 2018

April 23, 2018

Malcolm Brown
John Davies
Shelly Bruce
Scott Millar
Tricia Geddes
Merydee Duthie
James Malizia
Gilles Michaud
Douglas Breithaupt
Guy Bujold
Joanne Gibb
Michael Day
Scott Newark
Harjit Sajjan
Richard Feltham
Stephen Burt
Greta Bossenmaier
Shelly Bruce
Scott Jones
Dominic Rochon
Douglas Breithaupt
John Davies
Sophie Beecher
Cherie Henderson
Scott Millar
Douglas Breithaupt
John Davies
Sophie Beecher
Cherie Henderson
Scott Millar
Charles Arnott
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Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety
Director General, Department of Public Safety
Associate Chief, CSE
Director General, CSE
Assistant Director, CSIS
Special Advisor, CSIS
Assistant Commissioner, RCMP
Deputy Commissioner, RCMP
Director and General Counsel, Department of Justice
Interim Vice-Chairperson, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission
Director, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission
Individual, Lieutenant-General (Retired)
Individual, Policy Analyst
Minister of National Defence
Director General, Department of National Defence
Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence, Department of National Defence
Chief, CSE
Associate Chief, CSE
Deputy Chief, CSE
Deputy Chief, CSE
Director and General Counsel, Department of Justice
Director General, Department of Public Safety
Director of Intelligence Policy, Department of Public Safety
Director General, CSIS
Director General, CSE
Director and General Counsel, Department of Justice
Director General, Department of Public Safety
Director of Intelligence Policy, Department of Public Safety
Director General, CSIS
Director General, CSE
Manager of Strategic Policy, CSE
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